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INTRODUCTION
Enron.
Worldcom.
Adelphia.
Global Crossing.
Tyco.
Corporate scandals have made the front pages. Congress has gotten
in the act. Members have held numerous hearings, given speeches,
and, ultimately, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.1 The Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has been busy writing regulations and
leaning on the stock exchanges to modify their listing requirements,
all in order to restore “investor confidence.” Federal prosecutors have
indicted executives of Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia and their
minions in the auditing and investment banking industries.2 State
officials have also been active. Several states have passed statutes
that resemble or go beyond the strictures of Sarbanes-Oxley.3 Robert
Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney, has indicted the CEO
and other officers of Tyco.4 And New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer has vastly increased his political standing by taking on the
brokerage houses, perhaps following in the footsteps of Rudolf
Giuliani, another renowned prosecutor of corporate criminals.5 The
leaders of corporate America have been galvanized to action, forming
committees and task forces, issuing reports, and giving speeches.
But where has Delaware been through all this? No bills have
been introduced in Delaware’s legislature; no hearings held by its
committees; its law enforcement agents have taken no action; and its
executives have stayed mum. How is it that Delaware—the home of
what has long been viewed as the de facto national corporate law—has
sat on the sidelines?
1.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201 et
seq. (2005)).
2.
Editorial, “Perp Walks” and Watchdogs Can Thwart Corporate Crime, USA TODAY, July
9, 2004, at 10A.
3.
Deborah Solomon, Zealous States Shake Up Legal Status Quo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28,
2003, at A4 (noting that at least 20 states have passed or are considering their own version of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and that some of the laws are tougher than the federal regulations); Laura
Mahoney, New Laws Target Corporate Accountability, Conform Calif. Penalties to SarbanesOxley, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1608 (Sept. 29, 2003) (describing new California law);
Carolyn Whetzel, Governor Signs Bill to Tighten Corporate Accounting Practices, 34 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 1446 (Sept. 2, 2002) (describing California measures going beyond those of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
4.
See News Release, District Attorney-New York County, Sept. 12, 2002, http://www.
manhattanda.org/whatsnew/press/2002-09-12.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2005) (announcing
indictment of Tyco’s former CEO, CFO, and Chief Corporate Counsel).
5.
See, e.g., David Teather, Attorney General Spitzer to Run for New York Governor, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 8, 2004, at 18 (“Eliot Spitzer, the campaigning New York attorney general who
has made his name battling corruption on Wall Street, yesterday announced plans to run for
state governor. Mr. Spitzer has risen to prominence by exposing some of the worst practices that
took hold among investment banks during the dotcom boom of the late 1990s.”).
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In this Article, we take a step back from the recent scandals
and the responses they have generated and ask some logically prior
questions. What is the structure of corporate lawmaking in the
United States? What is the relation between federal and state
corporate lawmaking?6 And how does that relationship shape the
style and content of corporate law?
The relationship between federal lawmaking power and state—
in particular Delaware—corporate law has become the focus of
significant scholarly attention. In a recent article, Mark Roe has
argued that, because of the possibility of federal intervention, most
Delaware corporate law rules either mimic the rules favored by
federal lawmakers or get preempted by federal law.7 In Roe’s world,
states, and in particular Delaware, are basically federal
implementation agents who enjoy little autonomy. Roe views the
federal enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the ultimate proof of
his thesis, with the federal authorities “[d]ropping [p]retense” and
“squelching the states with [their] own substantive law.”8
Responding to Roe in an article contemporaneous to ours,
Roberta Romano argues that states compete largely unimpeded by
federal threats because states correlatively exercise control over
Congress.9 According to Romano, the key components of state
corporate law—fiduciary duties and the allocation of authority
between managers and shareholders—have not been changed by
federal law.10 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is, at most, a fairly narrow
exception as it arguably alters the allocation of authority only in its
audit committee provisions.11
The articles by Roe and Romano represent the latest chapter of
the classic state-competition debate in corporate law, where some
scholars posit that federal regulation is needed to prevent a race to the
bottom,12 while others maintain that federal intervention is
6.
The literature on this question is expanding. Important recent contributions include:
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring 2003, at 26;
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Robert B. Thompson,
Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 99 (2003); and Robert B. Thompson &
Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections on Federalism, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 859 (2003).
7.
See Roe, supra note 6, at 591–92.
8.
Id. at 632–33.
9.
Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate
Governance? 39–40 (Yale Univ. Int’l Ctr. For Fin., Working Paper No. 05-02, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=693484.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 34.
12. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1441 (1992) (arguing that, in
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undesirable and existing federal rules should be repealed in order not
to impede a race to the top.13 Roe’s thesis implies that the whole
debate is misconceived because the federal authorities call all the
shots. Romano contends that state competition, and the concomitant
race to the top, is alive and well even after Sarbanes-Oxley.
Our position differs both from Roe’s and Romano’s. We argue
that the possibility of federal preemption constitutes a threat to
Delaware, but this threat is significant only in times—such as during
the recent corporate scandals—when systemic change is seen as
generating a significant populist payoff. Sarbanes-Oxley is neither the
death knell for state competition, as Roe suggests, nor an aberration,
as Romano argues, but a response to a particular political climate that
constitutes a threat to Delaware’s highly-profitable chartering
business.
We further suggest that Delaware has adapted to this threat
by pursuing what we will call a classical or 19th century common law
model of lawmaking. But this classical model of lawmaking entails
some intrinsic limitations, including that legal change is slow,
standard-based, and incremental. These limitations explain how
Delaware responded to the recent corporate scandals and, in turn,
create a space where the relationship between federal rules and
Delaware law is symbiotic, rather than competitive as depicted by the
classical state-competition debate. Our thesis thus seeks to explain
the structure of Delaware corporate law and to offer a proper domain
for federal law even for commentators broadly sympathetic to the
race-to-the-top view.
In Part I, we analyze the institutional and political landscape
of corporate lawmaking. Although Delaware exercises a significant
lawmaking role, it is faced with an omnipresent specter of a federal
takeover, which could threaten the substantial income the state
derives from franchise fees. The principal threat for Delaware is the
possibility that federal intervention will be triggered by a situation in
which systemic change generates significant populist political payoffs.
This danger is aggravated by Delaware’s apparent lack of democratic
legitimacy: why should a small state set national policy for corporate
certain areas, state competition leads to rules biased towards managerial interests); William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663–66
(1974) (arguing that state competition results in a race to the bottom).
13. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919–20 (1982) (postulating
that Delaware has attracted corporations because its laws maximize shareholder value); see
generally Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) (calling for repealing much of federal securities regulation and
replacing it with state law).
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law? It is in Delaware’s interest to structure its law to minimize its
exposure to such an attack. In addition, Delaware must take account
of the rules on personal jurisdiction and on conflict of laws embedded
in the federal structure.
Part II identifies a number of salient traits that characterize
Delaware’s corporate law. Most important and controversial legal
rules are the product of judge-made law. Judicial opinions are filled
with quasi-deterministic reasoning. Statutory amendments to the
corporation law are initially drafted by a bar committee, are adopted
without change or debate by the legislature, and address largely
technical and noncontroversial matters. Delaware’s judiciary has
substantial expertise on corporate law and is nonpolitical. In contrast
to Delaware’s first-rate system for the private enforcement of
corporate laws, public enforcement is virtually nonexistent. And the
scope of corporate law is largely confined to the regulation of the
internal affairs of a corporation.
In Part III, we argue that these traits can be understood as
adaptations to the political and institutional landscape in which
Delaware operates. In many respects, Delaware’s corporate law may
be the last vestige of the classical 19th century common law model in
America: most important legal rules are promulgated by a
nonpartisan, expert judiciary; these rules are presented as derived
from long-standing and widely accepted principles; the law is enforced
through civil litigation brought by private parties; and even legislative
amendments generate neither debate nor controversy. All this has the
effect of creating and enhancing a technocratic, apolitical gloss over
Delaware’s corporate law and thus helps to shield Delaware from
being attacked for lacking democratic legitimacy. At the same time,
the scope of Delaware’s corporate law is designed to minimize conflicts
by assuring that Delaware has the requisite personal jurisdiction over
defendants to enforce its law effectively and that the prevailing
conflict rules point to substantive Delaware law as applicable to a
dispute.
In Part IV, we assess Delaware’s response to the recent
corporate scandals and the division of corporate lawmaking roles
between Delaware and the federal government. We argue that
Delaware’s response to the scandals—or rather, the lack thereof—
flows from its adherence to the classical common law model. Faced
with corporate scandals, calls for action, and Sturm und Drang,
Congress passed sweeping legislation and Eliot Spitzer crusaded
against Wall Street. But Delaware waits until a legal dispute is
brought in its courts, and even then addresses the issues only in an
incremental fashion. While this means that Delaware has been out of
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the limelight, potentially hurting its image in the short term, staying
out of the political limelight is in Delaware’s long-term interest.
Spitzer may be a successful politician, and he may even be the right
Attorney General for New York, but he would not be the best person to
assure that hundreds of millions in annual franchise fees keep flowing
into Delaware’s coffers. But because the classical common law style,
together with jurisdictional and conflict rules, constrain Delaware,
federal law is needed to complement Delaware’s. This is so where
Delaware’s common law regime cannot effectively supply the optimal
legal regime—e.g., because it requires public enforcement or is highly
regulatory—or where the rules on personal jurisdiction or conflicts
inhibit Delaware’s ability to regulate. In that respect, the relation
between federal law and Delaware law is symbiotic, rather than
competitive: Delaware is happy to have federal law pick up the slack
and thereby reduce the likelihood that ineffective regulation produces
a populist backlash.
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF CORPORATE LAWMAKING
In this Part, we examine the division of corporate lawmaking
between federal and state authorities.
We provide a stylized
description of two related landscapes of corporate lawmaking—the
institutional and the political—and analyze the powers of and
constraints placed on lawmaking by federal actors and by Delaware.
A. The Institutions of Corporate Lawmaking
Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the allocation of
corporate lawmaking authority in the United States. Congress sits at
the top of the chart. There is little constitutional doubt that, if
Congress wished to enact a national corporate law that would displace
all state corporate law, it could do so pursuant to its power under the
Commerce Clause.14

14. See Roe, supra note 6, at 607–20 (discussing topics where federal rules have displaced
state rules).
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Given this authority, Congress faces several options. It can
legislate corporate law directly, enacting either a comprehensive
corporate law or discrete elements. It can set relatively broad
standards and then establish an administrative agency, such as the
SEC, with subsidiary lawmaking powers. It can set broad standards
and leave it to courts to adjudicate cases and develop the law through
a common law process. It can enact enabling provisions which leave
the task of making specific rules to the domain of private choice. Or it
can do nothing and thereby leave the regulation of corporate conduct
to the states.
If Congress is willing to allow the states to act, the states then
face similar options: to legislate directly; to establish an
administrative agency; to let courts develop rules through the common
law process; or to enact enabling provisions. In addition, states must
determine the applicable “choice of law” rules: should the applicable
law be the law of the corporation’s state of incorporation; should it be
the law of its principal place of business; or should a forum state apply
its own law even if the corporation’s ties to the state are more
tenuous?15
Abstracting for the moment from public choice concerns (to be
covered in the next Section), a public-regarding legislature would need
to consider a variety of factors in deciding how best to legislate in the
corporate area.
First, there is the question of institutional
competence. Promulgating detailed fine-grained rules requires a
certain level of institutional infrastructure that an administrative
agency, like the SEC, may possess, but that a legislature is likely to
lack. Second, there is the question of the appropriate degree of
decentralization. Is a uniform national rule optimal? Is it better to
allow for diversity among the states?
To what extent should
companies be permitted to set their own rules?
But Figure 1 only provides part of the picture. For people who
focus on corporate law, a picture of corporate lawmaking that puts
Congress at the top and the Delaware courts, as a subset of other state
courts, toward the bottom fails to capture who the important corporate
law actors are.
If one focuses not on lawmaking power but on lawmaking role,
a different picture emerges. Consider, in this regard, Figure 2.

15. State legislatures’ freedom of action in this regard may be subject to some constitutional
constraints. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645–46 (1982) (holding that Illinois’
antitakeover statute that applied to companies with tenuous contacts to the state violated the
Commerce Clause).
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Figure 2 recognizes that courts, in the process of resolving disputes,
often have the first opportunity to address problems through
lawmaking. As Hart and Sacks pointed out:
In the development of Anglo-American legal systems, courts have functioned
characteristically as the place of initial resort for the settlement of problems which have
failed of private solution.
. . . [T]he body of decisional law announced by the courts in the disposition of these
problems tends always to be the initial and continues to be the underlying body of law
governing the society. Legislatures and administrative agencies tend always to make
law by way not of original solution of social problems, but by alteration of the solutions
first laid down by the courts.16

Hart and Sacks’s notion of courts as first-line lawmakers
provides an important modification of the picture of lawmaking
authority in Figure 1. In the first instance, a myriad of corporate law
disputes are brought to the Delaware Court of Chancery. Other
corporate law disputes are brought to the federal courts or the courts
of other states.17 In resolving these disputes, courts will often be the
first body to address a problem though lawmaking.
Consider Figure 2 in more detail. Controversies arise among
corporations, managers, and investors; and between corporations and
employees, regulators, citizens and others. When these controversies
become legal disputes, they can go either to the Delaware courts, other
state courts, or the federal system. Which forum parties resort to for
litigating their disputes, in turn, is influenced and sometimes
determined by two additional elements peculiar to the U.S. federal
system. The first element concerns personal jurisdiction. Under the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state courts can assert
jurisdiction only over defendants who have the requisite minimum
contacts with the forum state. The second element concerns the rules
on conflict of laws. These rules, which are part of the law of each
state, determine which jurisdiction’s law applies to a dispute. Under
the prevailing conflict of laws rules, the law of the state of
incorporation typically governs the internal affairs of the
corporation.18 With respect to other issues, however, these rules will
rarely point to the law of the state of incorporation as governing a
dispute.
But, as shown in Figure 2, public controversies will
occasionally avoid the legal machinery entirely.
Instead, such
16.
MAKING
1994).
17.
18.

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 163–64 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
E.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 303–310 (1971).
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controversies are brought to the SEC or directly to either the state
legislature or to the U.S. Congress. Moreover, once a legal dispute has
been adjudicated by the courts, parties19 interested in the legal rule
promulgated face a decision whether to accept the result or to seek to
have it changed. For disputes adjudicated within the Delaware
system, the choices are to turn to the Delaware legislature,20 to go to
the SEC,21 or to lobby Congress.22 Similarly, parties dissatisfied with
the legal rules emerging from federal court adjudications can turn
either directly to Congress or to the SEC.23
While, as depicted in Figure 1, members of the Delaware
judiciary may appear to be little more than secondary actors, Figure 2
indicates that Delaware judges can have a critical role.24 Whether
they do or not depends on where disputes are litigated and how often
the Delaware legislature or federal lawmakers intervene.
As
discussed in Part II, Delaware courts adjudicate, in the first instance,
most corporate law disputes involving public corporations that raise
issues addressed by state law,25 and the Delaware legislature rarely
intervenes. As discussed in Part III, this manner of lawmaking serves
to fend off federal intervention.
B. The Politics of Federal Intervention
Figures 1 and 2 also provide a starting point for understanding
the politics of federal intervention in corporate lawmaking. Generally,
Delaware exercises the first-line rulemaking role for much of
19. By parties, we mean interest groups and political actors that have a stake in the legal
rule announced in a case, rather than the specific parties to the litigation.
20. An example of this is the enactment of Section 102(b)(7) in the wake of Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005).
21. An example here is the SEC’s reversal of the discriminatory self-tender defense
sanctioned generally in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 1010 (5th ed. 1998).
22. An example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s prohibition of all loans to executives. See
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance 86–
89, 150–53 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 52/2004, 2004),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=596101.
23. See infra Part II.A, especially note 90 (detailing several instances where rules on insider
trading announced by federal courts have been reversed by Congress or the SEC). Since federal
courts sometimes also interpret state law, some federal court rulings can also be reversed by
state legislatures.
24. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239–75 (1986) (Hercules, the judge, in a theory of
“law as integrity”); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–30 (1977) (Hercules, the
judge, deciding cases on principle rather than policy).
25. For a contrary view, see Thompson & Sale, supra note 6, at 860–61 (arguing that
corporate governance is regulated primarily through federal securities law and shareholder
litigation).
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corporate law, mostly because Delaware courts are in the forefront of
resolving corporate disputes. A significant prospect of change can arise
only if a significant interest group is highly dissatisfied or if political
actors foresee political benefit from advocating legal change. Even
when there is a prospect for such change, however, there are forces
pushing back.26
Consider the possibility of congressional intervention.27
Suppose that some politicians become convinced that interstate
competition for corporate charters results in a race to the bottom;28 or
they favor a federal takeover of state corporate law for more naked

26. Our view of the threat of federal intervention thus differs from Mark Roe’s recent
insightful analysis of the issue. Roe regards the federal authorities as having some independent
substantive policy preferences. In order not to trigger federal intervention, state rules must
match or come close to these preferences. See Roe, supra note 6, at 607. As discussed in this
Section, we see federal intervention as a product of either interest-group lobbying (where interest
groups have both preferences for the actual content of legal rules and the identity of the
regulator) or populist politics and regard the latter as the more serious threat.
27. Piecemeal reform can also come from the SEC, with a somewhat different sort of
political dynamic. See, e.g., Editorial, Headline Risk at the SEC, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2004, at
A16 [hereinafter Headline Risk at the SEC] (accusing the SEC of adopting cumbersome
regulations on mutual fund trading for their headline value); Mark Maremont & Deborah
Solomon, Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24,
2003, at A1 (describing various reasons for the SEC’s cautious approach to regulation).
Historically, there have been a variety of more or less pervasive SEC incursions into the
traditional topics of Delaware corporate law. The more confined incursions include rules
governing going private transactions, tender offers, and dual-class recapitalizations. The more
pervasive ones include the proxy rules that govern shareholder voting and insider trading rules.
Without delving deeply into the politics of agency rulemaking, one can note that the SEC is
subject to many of the same pressures as Congress, and that, when the key constituencies are
satisfied with the status quo, SEC attempts to expand its reach can usually be resisted.
Additionally, the SEC can only act to the extent Congress has delegated the requisite authority,
and can be overridden by Congress or the courts if it steps out of line. See Bus. Roundtable v.
SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC overstepped its statutory
authority by controlling the allocation of substantive powers among classes of shareholders).
Stock exchanges also have the ability to act, either on their own behest or because of SEC
pressure. While the exchanges have wider latitude to make corporate law rules than the SEC
does, they are constrained by their desire to attract listings, and competition from other
exchanges. They may thus be reluctant to adopt rules opposed by managers who exercise control
over where companies are listed (more so than over where they are incorporated). More
fundamentally, exchanges lack enforcement powers. The most serious sanction—delisting—is
hardly credible when there are competing exchanges, and, moreover, hardly a consolation for
shareholders who are supposedly helped by the rules. For this reason, only clear-cut rules by the
exchanges that create no ex-post ambiguities have real bite (if a violation is obvious, most
companies will not dare to do it, even if enforcement is weak). See generally Edward Rock,
Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 697–700 (2002) (discussing stock exchanges’ difficulties in enforcing
their listing agreement when firms can easily list on competing exchanges).
28. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 1441 (enumerating areas in which federal
regulation should be expanded); Cary, supra note 12, at 705 (asserting that “[t]he absurdity of
this race for the bottom . . . should arrest the conscience of the American bar”).
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political considerations. How might parties favoring the status quo
resist such a move?
They might make a constitutional argument: namely, that such
a wholesale displacement of state corporate law would be beyond
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. As a matter of
contemporary constitutional law, this is a weak—indeed, nearly
laughable—argument.29 In light of Congress’s constitutional ability to
intercede directly and to shift corporate lawmaking authority among
the various players, the “internal affairs” doctrine—according to which
the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of the
29. There is no plausible constitutional argument that Congress would not have the power,
under the Commerce Clause, to preempt state corporate law with a national corporate law.
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution (the Commerce Clause) grants Congress the power to
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the Several States.” This has been
expansively interpreted. For good, comprehensive discussions, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-3 (2d ed. 2002); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 5-4, 5-5 (3d ed. 2000). From 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court did not hold a single
congressional action to be beyond the regulatory power conferred by the Commerce Clause. Id.
During this period, for example, the Supreme Court held that Congress had Commerce Clause
power to regulate stock in public utilities, Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 96 (1946),
and to regulate interstate insurance transactions, United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322
U.S. 533, 553 (1944). Indeed, the Commerce Clause is the sole jurisdictional basis for federal
securities regulation.
In a line of cases beginning in 1995, the Supreme Court indicated that there exist limits to
Congress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lopez, 511 U.S.
549, 551 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000) (holding the civil damages provision in the Violence
Against Women Act unconstitutional). See also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850–51
(2000) (interpreting federal law narrowly to avoid constitutional doubts whether Congress had
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause with regard to arson); Solid Waste Agency of No.
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001) (same with regard
to migratory birds); Chemerinsky, supra this note, § 3-3.5. But this line of cases focuses entirely
on the extent to which Congress can regulate noncommercial or noneconomic activity under the
Commerce Clause. There is no suggestion in the opinions or in subsequent case law that the
judicial skepticism would extend to indisputably commercial activity such as securities
regulation or corporate governance.
The only genuine Commerce Clause issue that has recently arisen in corporate and securities
law is the extent to which the Supremacy Clause or the (dormant) Commerce Clause preempt or
preclude state regulation of takeovers. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 630 (1982)
(holding that Illinois’ state takeover statute unduly burdened interstate commerce in violation of
the Commerce Clause); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987) (holding
that Indiana’s statute regulating the acquisition of control shares in public corporations did not
violate the Commerce Clause). In CTS, in which the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s control
share acquisition statute, the Court held that the statute did not violate the Commerce Clause,
as it did not discriminate against interstate commerce, 481 U.S. at 89–98, nor subject
corporations to inconsistent standards, id. at 88–89. Neither case raises any question as to
Congress’s power to preempt state corporate law in the area of tender offers; only about whether
Congress in fact intended to do so and, in the case of CTS, whether, in the absence of any such
intent, the Commerce Clause otherwise precluded the states from acting. Indeed, neither case
makes any sense without an assumption that Congress could choose to regulate takeovers
nationally.
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state of incorporation—is better thought of as a contingent allocation
of responsibility based on prudential considerations, and not any sort
of iron dictate.
But even if a frontal constitutional attack is weak, the
underlying themes of “corporate federalism” or “cooperative
federalism”30 and states’ rights have significant political and legal
salience. It could, in other words, be an effective policy argument in
the halls of Congress or the offices of the SEC.31 It could also
influence courts when they interpret ambiguous federal legislation.32
But, of course, the course of legislation is only partially
determined by such policy and legal arguments. Interest groups
matter too. Figures 1 and 2 provide a useful guide to those actors with
sufficiently large interests to get involved politically. The constituents
with an interest in corporate law are primarily managers and
investors, with several other groups, such as lawyers and employees,
taking a secondary interest in corporate law rules. To the extent that
managers are opposed to a change in the law, organizations such as
the Business Roundtable would lobby against it. To the extent that
institutional investors are opposed, one would expect them to lobby as
well. Moreover, Delaware is itself interested in limiting federal
intrusions into corporate law, and Delaware’s interests are
influentially represented. For example, during the 107th Congress,
when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted, both Delaware senators
were on committees that considered the bill: Joseph Biden on the
Judiciary Committee and Thomas Carper on the Banking, Housing &
Urban Affairs Committee.33

30. While one might speak of a “corporate law federalism,” it is more (descriptively)
accurate to think of the distribution of corporate lawmaking as “decentralization.” See Edward L.
Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,
910–14, 950-951 (1994) (arguing that federalism is better understood as managerial
decentralization). Whatever the general persuasiveness of Rubin and Feeley’s view, in corporate
law it is accurate: the extent of Congress’s power under the Constitution to legislate in the
corporate area is such that “our corporate law federalism” is a matter of an implicit or explicit
decentralization driven by bureaucratic, political and legal process factors, as we discuss in
greater detail in the text.
31. See Letter from Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, Delaware Supreme Court, to Alan
Beller, Director of Division of Corporate Finance, SEC (Mar. 11, 2004) (expressing reservations
about the proposed SEC rule on shareholder nominations because it “intrudes upon and may be
in conflict with corporate internal affairs that are the province of state law.”) (on file with
authors).
32. The U.S. Supreme Court has been solicitous of states’ primacy in corporate law. See,
e.g., CTS, 481 U.S. at 91; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977) (refusing to
broaden Rule 10b-5 to cover merger transactions such that “established state policies of
corporate regulation would be overridden”).
33. [2001-2002 Transfer Binder] Cong. Index (CCH) 11,501-02 (Aug. 23, 2002).
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Finally, the Constitution and internal congressional rules
make it easier to stop legislation than to enact it. To pass a law,
legislation must ordinarily be approved by congressional committees;
be put on the agenda by the congressional leadership; be approved by
majorities in both houses of Congress; either not be filibustered or be
favored by a supermajority of the Senate; and either be approved by
the President or favored by veto-proof majorities in both houses. As a
result, a determined minority of legislators can often block legislation
favored by a majority.
To be sure, even with this built-in status quo bias, Delaware
must keep the principal organized interest groups affected by
Delaware corporate law reasonably satisfied in order to avoid federal
intervention. For several reasons, however, we do not regard federal
intervention due to interest group pressure as a major threat for
Delaware.
First, “satisfied” in this context relates not only to the specific
legal rules in force but more generally to a judgment of comparative
institutional competence—namely, which lawmaking institution is
likely to perform better over the long term. Even if managers or
investors are dissatisfied with a particular substantive rule of
Delaware law, there are a number of plausible reasons why they may
nevertheless not push for federal intervention.
They may, for
instance, believe that they will carry more relative weight in Delaware
than in any of the alternative federal institutions, perhaps because
unions or SEC bureaucrats will be more influential at the federal
level.
In addition, Delaware may be more responsive to new
developments, have greater expertise in applying rules, or otherwise
be able to devise rules that are superior to those likely to emerge from
federal actors. Moreover, it may be less costly to influence Delaware
than Congress or the SEC. And finally, a state system may be viewed
as a less risky forum because, for example, it is less likely to generate
radical legislation or because it affords greater opportunities to optout of legislation (by changing corporate domiciles) than a monopolist
federal regulator.
Second, even when Congress has enacted legislation otherwise
trampling on states’ rights, it has historically taken special care not to
intrude upon Delaware. For example, the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act,34 which in effect deprived state courts of
jurisdiction over securities class actions for misrepresentations or
deceit and eliminated the states’ ability to apply their own securities
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77(p) (1933)). Technically, the Act makes
most securities class actions removable to federal court. Id.
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laws on misrepresentations or deceit in class actions, contains the socalled “Delaware carve-out.”35 The carve-out specifically exempts
actions for misrepresentations based on the corporate law of a
Similarly, the Class Action
company’s state of incorporation.36
Fairness Act, designed to assure that most class actions with a
national class of plaintiffs are adjudicated in federal court, specifically
excludes corporate law class actions arising under the law of the
company’s state of incorporation.37
Perhaps not coincidentally,
Delaware’s Senator Carper was one of eight original sponsors (and one
of a handful of Democratic supporters) of the Senate version of the
Act.38 Thus, for one reason or another, Delaware’s corporate law
seems to enjoy great respect on Capitol Hill.
Most importantly, however, Delaware has strong incentives to
keep investors and managers satisfied even apart from the possibility
of federal intervention. Investors and managers control incorporation
decisions of companies when they go public and decisions of existing
public companies to reincorporate. As Delaware caters anyway to
investors and managers in order to attract incorporations, keeping
investors and managers sufficiently satisfied that they do not lobby for
federal intervention should not require much additional effort or
adjustment.39 Moreover, to the extent that particular investors and
managers are dissatisfied, it is usually much easier for them to induce
a particular firm to incorporate in a different state than to lobby for a
change in federal law.
A greater concern than federal intervention due to interest
group pressure is the possibility that federal intervention will be
triggered by a situation in which systemic change generates a
significant populist political payoff (a payoff unrelated to interest
35. See, e.g., Spehar v. Fuchs, No. 02-9352CM, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10406, at *25 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (noting that the Securities Act contains three exceptions known as the
“Delaware carve-outs”).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1) (2005).
37. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(a), 119 Stat. 4, 13 (2005) (to be codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(d)(2)).
38. Similarly, Senator Biden, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, probably
influenced the committee’s decision not to eliminate state of incorporation as a venue for
bankruptcy cases. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some
Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1998). Although Delaware derives some benefits
from being a venue in major bankruptcy cases, these benefits pale in comparison to those from
being the domicile of most publicly traded companies. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The
Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 694–95 n.50 (2002).
39. To be sure, the relative power of investors and managers may differ from the
incorporation and reincorporation contexts to the context of federal lobbying, thus providing
some incentives for the groups that are more powerful in the lobbying context to seek federal
intervention. But the direction of that difference is unclear, unstable, hard to predict, and likely
to be small. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 740–45.
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group pressure).40 Such situations can arise in times of crisis or
scandal or due to political entrepreneurship.41
High-profile scandals can shift the balance of power both in
Congress and, derivatively, at the SEC, by triggering a deep, populist
theme in American politics and energizing broad, loosely organized
constituencies. The classic examples of large scale federal incursion
into corporate law in response to crisis and scandal are the enactment
of the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act,
which created the SEC and, more recently, the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the changes in the stock exchange listing
rules. In both instances, we had major scandals that coincided with
the bursting of a stock market bubble that left investors licking their
wounds and looking for someone to blame.42 Congressional hearings
were held and there was a feeling that “something must be done.”
Congress felt pressure to act, and act it did.43
The danger of a populist backlash against Delaware is
aggravated by the lurking argument that Delaware lacks political
legitimacy. Why should a small state—a “pigmy,” as a leading
proponent of a federal corporate law referred to it pejoratively44—have
so significant a lawmaking role for national corporate law and derive
huge profits in the process? From the perspective of democratic
theory, would it not make more sense if the members of Congress,
elected by all U.S. citizens, made the law affecting corporations with
national operations and shareholders? It is against this background
lack of democratic legitimacy that populist appeals for federal
intervention will be made and resonate.45
40. For example, the press describes Eliot Spitzer’s actions as populist. See, e.g., John
Cassidy, The Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 7,
2003 at 54, 54 (“Spitzer was well placed to launch a populist crusade.”); Editorial, Spitzer’s
Grandstand, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2004, at A14 (“New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
fancies himself a populist hero for assailing Wall Street misdeeds . . . .”).
41. For examples from the history of U.S. regulation of business, see MARK ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 26–45, 51–146 (1994).
42. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (noting that most new regulations follow stock market crashes).
43. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 22, at 146–74 (discussing how the Act is a product of
political entrepreneurship, rather than interest-group lobbying); Headline Risk at the SEC,
supra note 27 (accusing the SEC of adopting cumbersome mutual fund regulations for their
headline value).
44. Cary, supra note 12, at 701.
45. See, e.g., Cary, supra note 12, at 698 (querying whether Delaware should lead in
corporate law when it gives so much power to management); Jonathan Chait, Rogue State: The
Case Against Delaware, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19–26, 2002, at 20, 22–23 (crediting Delaware
with “the national emasculation of corporate governance”); Triumph of the Pygmy State,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2003, at 55, 55–56 (questioning why the laws of a state with approximately
0.3 percent of population governs more than half of public corporations).
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Alas for Delaware, it can do nothing to deprive Congress of its
power to enact corporate laws. Likewise, it can do little to prevent
crises, scandals, or the emergence of political entrepreneurs. What
Delaware can do, however, is structure its law in a manner adapted to
preserve its scope and reduce the likelihood that it will become the
target of systemic change.
As we discuss in Part III, many traits of Delaware corporate
law can be understood as adaptive to the institutional and political
landscape in which Delaware, as the leading supplier of corporate law,
must operate. This landscape includes Delaware’s constitutional and
political vulnerability to federal intervention and the strictures
imposed by jurisdictional and conflict rules. Our claim is not that
Delaware purposefully adopted all these traits to serve its aims. We
do not believe that the connection is that direct. Rather, the claim is
that key patterns of Delaware corporate lawmaking are consistent
with the Delaware actors being sensitive to their institutional role and
its limitations. Even if these patterns have not been purposefully
adopted, the fact that they serve this function contributes to their
survival.
Finally, we will argue in Part IV that not every federal
intervention into corporate law is against Delaware’s interest.
Because of the political constraints placed on Delaware by its desire to
avoid systemic change and because of the legal constraints imposed by
jurisdictional and conflict rules, Delaware cannot effectively regulate
certain types of misconduct. In these areas, which include much of
traditional securities regulation, Delaware should have no major
problem with federal regulation. To the contrary, Delaware may favor
federal intervention to the extent that it makes the corporate law
system as a whole less scandal prone and reduces the chances of a
populist backlash against Delaware as a principal regulator. Thus,
the relationship between federal and state regulation in corporate law
is, in our view, much more symbiotic than most commentators
acknowledge.46
II. SALIENT TRAITS OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
Delaware’s corporate law has a number of salient and
characteristic traits. These traits concern its style, the manner in
which it is enforced, and its scope. In this Part, we explore Delaware
46. Cf. Roe, supra note 6, at 592 (focusing on the role of federal regulation as Delaware’s
competition); Bebchuk, supra note 12, at 1441 (calling for federal intervention to preempt state
law); Cary, supra note 12, at 701–03 (same); Romano, supra note 13, at 2361–62 (arguing that
much of the federal securities regulation should be repealed and replaced with state law).

2005]

SYMBIOTIC FEDERALISM

1591

corporate law’s traits in six areas: the breadth of its judge-made law;
its quasi-deterministic judge-made law; the making of its statutory
law; its judiciary; its enforcement mechanism; and the overall scope of
its corporate law. As we will explain in the next Part, all these traits
can be seen as adaptations to the peculiar landscape in which
Delaware, a tiny state that is the leading supplier of corporate law,
must operate.
A. The Breadth of Judge-Made Law
The most noteworthy trait of Delaware’s corporate law is the
extent to which important and controversial legal rules are
promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by the legislature.
In Delaware, judge-made law, to the virtual exclusion of statutory law,
governs fundamental issues such as fiduciary duties of directors,
officers, and controlling shareholders, the prerequisites for a
derivative suit, and disclosure obligations. Even powers that the
Delaware code explicitly accords to the board of directors are subject
to a judicially created and interpreted duty not to use these powers for
“inequitable purposes.”47 Thus, judge-made, rather than statutory,
law governs issues such as:
• when directors are liable (the famous “business judgment”
rule);48
• what counts as a self-interested transaction;49
• who is regarded as a controlling shareholder;50
• the scope of a controlling shareholder’s obligations;51
• the legal test to determine the validity of a self-interestedtransaction;52
• when a director is considered “independent”;53

47. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (enjoining
management from expediting the annual stockholders’ meeting to obstruct a proxy fight with
dissident shareholders).
48. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(applying the business judgment rule from common law to find no director liability).
49. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002) (clarifying that, where selfdealing is absent, a director is interested when a decision materially benefits or detrimentally
impacts the director in a way not shared by the corporation or stockholders).
50. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114–15 (Del. 1994) (finding
that minority shareholder exercised actual control by dominating corporate affairs).
51. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (explaining when
the intrinsic fairness applies to parent-subsidiary dealings).
52. See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (establishing a legal
standard for evaluating a transaction when company directors are on both sides).
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• the legal effect of approval of a transaction by independent
directors or by disinterested shareholders;54
• what constitutes a “corporate opportunity”;55
• the legal tests regulating takeover defenses;56
• when a board can take actions that interfere with shareholder
franchise;57
• when a shareholder can institute a derivative suit without
making a prior demand on the board;58
• when shareholders lose their limited liability;59
• limitations on charitable giving;60 and
• the right of contestants to be reimbursed for expenses incurred
in proxy contests.61
Neither historic contingency nor the nature of the legal rules at
issue fully explains this breadth of judge-made law. To be sure, the
law of fiduciary duties has historically been developed by the
judiciary. Nevertheless, Delaware’s judge-made law is distinctive in a
number of ways. First, Delaware, whose economic well-being depends
on the franchise revenues it earns from public corporations, should be
expected to pay significant attention to the way its law is generated.
Other states, which do not derive significant economic benefits from
chartering companies, may be affected by inertia and inattention with
respect to the structure of their corporate law. In Delaware, however,
where franchise taxes account for almost 20 percent of the state

53. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) (explaining that directors are
independent when their decisions are based on the merits).
54. See, e.g., Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (shifting the burden of proof regarding fairness to the
shareholder-plaintiff in these circumstances).
55. See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996) (defining
“corporate opportunity” and explaining standards for when a director or officer may or may not
take the opportunity).
56. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (requiring
that “defensive measures must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed”).
57. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring
“compelling justification” for such actions).
58. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 818 (requiring pleading with particularity of facts
alleging self-interest, lack of independence, or action contrary to corporation’s best interests).
59. See, e.g., Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Tex. Am. Energy Corp., No. 8578, 1988 Del. Ch. Lexis
11, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 27, 1988) (listing instances when the court will pierce the veil to reach a
parent corporation).
60. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969)
(applying standard of reasonableness); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 61 (Del. 1991) (finding a
charitable gift to be reasonable in the context of approving a settlement).
61. See, e.g., Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344–45 (Del. 1983) (affirming
superior court’s reimbursement of reasonable expenses for proxy solicitation).
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budget,62 historical artifact cannot, by itself, explain why the
legislature has not taken a more active role.
Second, even though fiduciary duty law has historically been
judge-made, many other states have statutorily revised portions of
fiduciary duty law. For example, Indiana has a statute governing a
board’s fiduciary duties in a takeover contest;63 Idaho’s statute defines
“conflicting interest”;64 California’s statute defines “control”;65 Ohio’s
statute revises the burden of proof in shareholder lawsuits;66
Michigan’s statute defines a special class of independent directors and
accords them special rights in derivative proceedings;67 over 30 states
have passed statutes permitting a board to consider broader interests
in discharging their fiduciary duties;68 and the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, adopted by over 20 states, codified the
standards of conduct and liability for directors69 and the standards for
commencement and dismissal of derivative suits.70 Delaware law, by
contrast, contains no equivalent statutory provisions. Thus, corporate
law is judge-made in Delaware to a greater extent than in most other
states.
Third, the Delaware judiciary has taken the lead in expanding
the breadth of judge-made law beyond its traditional domain. Judicial
decisions in Delaware have thus created novel doctrines regulating
actions by a board of directors that are taken for inequitable
purposes71 or that are intended to interfere with shareholder
franchise72 and have minted a new fiduciary duty of disclosure.73
62. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 240 (1985).
63. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (LexisNexis 2004).
64. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-860(1) (2005).
65. CAL. CORP. CODE § 160 (West 2005).
66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.59(C)–(D) (West 2005).
67. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1495 (West 2005).
68. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice:
Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1827,
1828 tbl.3 (2002).
69. REV. MODEL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–8.31 (1999). The Comment notes that these rules
“spell[] out a practical working definition of ‘conflicting interest’” and are designed to create
“bright line specificity and predictability.” Id., subch. F, introductory cmt. For a discussion of the
tortured history of this effort and its ultimate failure, see R. Franklin Balotti & Joseph Hinsey
IV, Director Care, Conduct, and Liability: The Model Business Corporation Act Solution, 56 BUS.
LAW. 35, 35 (2000).
70. REV. MODEL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.40–7.46 (1999).
71. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (enjoining
management from expediting the annual stockholders’ meeting to obstruct a proxy fight with
dissident shareholders).
72. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1131–32 (Del. 2003); Blasius Indus., Inc.
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–63 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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While these new doctrines can all be justified as complementing
traditional fiduciary duties, they nevertheless represent an extension
of the historic breadth of these duties and have been rejected by other
jurisdictions.74 At a minimum, these doctrines show the great comfort
on the part of Delaware’s judiciary, and great tolerance on the part of
its legislature, for having the courts expand the scope of judge-made
law to address novel problems, rather than waiting for the legislature
to act.
Fourth, the Delaware Supreme Court has shown a certain
degree of discomfort with, perhaps even hostility to, legislative
intrusions into its domain. There are numerous examples of this
tendency.
• Section 262(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”) explicitly provides that, in an appraisal proceeding,
the fair value of shares is to be assessed “exclusive of any
element of value arising from any accomplishment or
expectation of the merger.”75 Yet, in Weinberger v. UOP, the
Delaware Supreme Court read this “to be a very narrow
exception to the appraisal process designed to eliminate use of
pro forma data and projections of a speculative variety . . .”76
• Section 144(a)(1) and (2) of the DGCL provides that a selfdealing transaction shall not be voidable solely for this reason
if it is approved after full disclosure by “a majority of the
disinterested directors” or “in good faith by vote of the
shareholders.”77 Yet, in Marciano v. Nakash, the Delaware
Supreme Court read this to require “approval by fully informed
disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested
stockholders under section 144(a)(2),” in order to insulate a
self-dealing transaction from attack.78
• Section 157(b) of the DGCL provides that “[i]n the absence of
actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors
as to the consideration for the issuance of such rights or options
and the sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive.”79 Yet, in
numerous compensation cases, the Delaware Supreme Court
73. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 21, at 499–500.
74. See, e.g., Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1581 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (declining to follow Blasius); Solfanelli v. Mainwaring, No. 91-6249, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18883, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1992) (finding no duty of candor under Pennsylvania law). Most
states have not had occasion to determine whether they will adopt these new doctrines.
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2005).
76. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 144(a)(1)–(2) (2005) (emphasis added).
78. 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (1987) (emphasis added).
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(b) (2005).
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reads this to permit review of grants of options (even to
nondirectors) under a waste standard, not the statutorily
decreed “actual fraud” standard.80
• Section 251(c) of the DGCL was amended in 1998 to permit a
merger agreement to expressly stipulate that it must “be
submitted to the stockholders whether or not the board of
directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its
advisability that the agreement is no longer advisable and
recommends that the stockholders reject it.”81
Yet, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Omnicare v. NCS held that this
very stipulation constituted a per se breach of fiduciary duty by
the board when a “cohesive group of stockholders with majority
voting power” concurrently agreed to vote in favor of the
merger.82
• Section 220 of the DGCL was amended in 2003 to afford a
stockholder of a Delaware corporation the right to inspect the
books and records of a subsidiary of the corporation as long as
“the corporation could obtain such records through the ‘exercise
of control’ over [the] subsidiary.”83 Yet earlier this year, the
Delaware Supreme Court ruled in Weinstein Enterprises Inc. v.
Orloff that, even though J.W. May, Inc. was a subsidiary of
Weinstein Enterprises and Weinstein Enterprises controlled its
affairs, a shareholder of Weinstein Enterprises was not entitled
by Section 220 to obtain any records of J.W. May that were not
in Weinstein Enterprises’ actual possession.84
Fifth, in Delaware, legislative overturning of judge-made
corporate law is practically unheard of.85 In the modern era, there has
80. See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979):
Section 157 was intended to protect directors’ business judgment in consideration
inuring to the corporation in exchange for creating and issuing stock options . . . [W]e
do not read section 157 as intended to erect a legal barrier to any claim for relief as to
an alleged gift or waste of corporate assets in the issuance of stock options where the
claim asserted is one of absolute failure of consideration.
See also Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997) (interpreting Section 157 to bar
claims for waste unless there was no consideration or actual fraud).
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2005).
82. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003).
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)(2)(b) (2005).
84. Weinstein Enterprises Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 511 (2005).
85. In other areas and other states, the legislature does act to overturn judge-made law.
See, e.g., H.R. 309, 142d Gen. Assem., 2d. Sess. (Del. 2004), available at http://www.legis.
state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?op
en (choose House Bill from Bill Type drop-down menu and type correct number in Bill Number
field; then click Go! button) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (overturning Delaware Supreme Court
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been only one significant instance of such overturning, and this
instance represents the classic exception that proves the rule. In
1985, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,86 greatly
increased the risk that directors would be held liable for breaches of
their duty of care. The decision, described by leading commentators as
“shocking”87 and “one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate
law,”88 led to the enactment of Section 102(b)(7). By permitting a
company to opt out of personal liability for good-faith breaches of the
duty of care, Section 102(b)(7) took the sting out of the Van Gorkom
decision. Numerous other states followed Delaware and corporations,
with wide shareholder support, quickly availed themselves of the
opportunity to opt-out of personal liability.89 But for this egregious
instance, we are not aware of any significant corporate law decision in
Delaware that has been legislatively overruled.90 In comparison, in
precedents on searches and seizures); H.R. 1, 140th Gen. Assem., 1st. Sess. (Del. 1999), available
at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&
Src=/lis/lis140.nsf/?open (click on All Legislation; then click on Search in Legislation and follow
instructions) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (overturning Delaware Supreme Court precedents on
statutes of limitations); H.R. 249, 140th Gen. Assem., 1st. Sess. (Del. 1999), available at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/
lis/lis140.nsf/?open (click on All Legislation; then click on Search in Legislation and follow
instructions) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (overturning Delaware Supreme Court precedents on
insurance law); Eric Robinson et al., State Takeover Statutes: A Fifty-State Survey 10, 20, 24,
40, 42, 56 (1989) (unpublished survey, on file with author) (noting that Colorado, Georgia,
Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia passed statutes overturning court decisions that
had invalidated poison-pill plans).
86. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
87. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 254 (2003).
88. Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS.
LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985).
89. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39
EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160, 1165–68 (1990).
90. According to an analysis of the legislative history and contemporary comments by
renowned Delaware practitioners, there have been 26 amendments to the Delaware General
Corporation Law since 1967 (the year the present modern corporation statute was enacted) that
have responded in some fashion to judicial decisions. See Memorandum from Amy Simmer,
Summer Associate at Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnel, to Roberta Romano (Summer 2005) (on
file with author). We would like to thank Morris, Nichols, and Roberta Romano for permission to
cite this memorandum. Of these 26 amendments, 3 related to federal tax law, 6 codified a
judicial decision or amended the law in a manner consistent with a judicial decision, and 11
responded to a judicial suggestion to clarify the law, clarified ambiguities, or addressed issues
raised but not decided in a judicial decision. None of these amendments can be characterized as a
judicial reversal.
Of the remaining 6 amendments, 2 “reversed” chancery court decisions rendered,
respectively, 19 and 22 years prior to the amendment, and 3 related to chancery court decisions
interpreting a statute and amended the statute in a way inconsistent with the chancery court
interpretation. We would characterize the former two amendments as legislative updates, rather
than legislative reversals, since the case law at issue was rather dated at the time of the
amendment and since the legislature would have acted more quickly had it been unhappy with
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the comparatively narrow field of insider trading, at least five
decisions by the United States Supreme Court or federal circuit courts
have been overturned by Congress or the SEC.91

the judicial decision at the time it was rendered. With respect to the latter three amendments,
there is an inherent ambiguity concerning whether the legislature thought that the court had
misinterpreted the statute or whether it thought that the court interpreted the statute correctly
as drafted but realized that it should have drafted the statute differently. In any case, none of
these amendments related to Delaware Supreme Court decisions, and the subject matter of the
amendments was narrow: they related to whether the appraisal provision in Section 262(i)
authorized an award of compound interest, whether members of a membership corporation enjoy
rights to inspect books and records equivalent to shareholders in stock companies, and whether
an annual meeting must be held even if written consents are obtained for the election of
directors. Thus, we would not characterize the judicial decisions that were reversed as
significant. The final amendment related to whether election inspectors may contact a broker or
similar institution to clarify its voting intentions when the broker has submitted multiple
proxies relating to more votes than shares registered in its name. In 1989, the chancery court
held that such clarification was not permissible, relying on a supreme court decision from 1971
that held “conflicting proxies, irreconcilable on their faces or from the books and records of the
corporation, may not be reconciled by extrinsic evidence.” Concord Fin. Group v. Tri-State Motor
Transit Co. of Del., 567 A.2d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 1989) (quoting Williams v. Sterling Oil of Okla., 273
A.2d 264, 265 (Del. 1971)). In 1990, the legislature provided by statute that brokers and similar
institutions may be consulted to reconcile overvotes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 231(d) (2005). This
issue is important, and the legislature’s timing suggests that it was stimulated by the 1989
decision. The 1989 decision was only rendered by the chancery court, however, and it appears
that the chancery court felt itself bound by the 1971 supreme court decision on point, which had
not been legislatively addressed for over 20 years.
91. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that there
is no private right of action where violation is premised on misappropriation theory), superceded
by statute, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20A(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(a) (2005) (establishing a
private right of action based on contemporaneous trading); Laventhall v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
704 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that insider owes no duty to abstain from trading to
holder of options), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. §
78t(d) (2005) (extending insider trading prohibition to derivatives where trading in underlying
security is not permitted); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066–69 (9th Cir. 1998)
(adopting “use” test), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b5-1 (2005) (establishing “awareness” test for insider trading); United States v. Chestman,
903 F.2d 75, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding, under the particular facts, that family members of
insiders owed no duty to family, corporation, or shareholders that obligated them to abstain from
trading), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b52(b)(3) (2005) (establishing presumptive duty of trust and confidence among family members);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–35 (1980) (holding that employee of printer
working for bidder had no relation with target shareholders that obligated employee to abstain
from trading), superceded by statute, Securities Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(2005) (prohibiting trading based on information related to tender offer received directly or
indirectly from bidder). One factor that is likely to contribute to the low rate of legislative
reversals in Delaware is the greater expertise of the Delaware court (relative to the Delaware
legislature and to federal courts) on issues of corporate law. But as we discuss below, the relative
expertise of Delaware’s judiciary is itself an adaptation to the threat of federal preemption. See
infra Parts II.D., II.E.
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B. The Quasi-Deterministic Style of Delaware’s Judge-Made Law
Beyond the breadth of judge-made law, the mode of judge-made
law is noteworthy.
As several commentators have recently
emphasized, judge-made Delaware law eschews hard rules in favor of
flexible and highly fact-intensive standards.92 This results in an
extraordinarily high degree of flexibility. A typical Delaware opinion
reads as if the specific facts, combined with long-standing and
universally accepted fiduciary principles, clearly dictate the outcome
of the case. This permits Delaware law to respond to new problems or
to revise the way it deals with old problems without openly admitting
that the judges have made new law or have changed old law.93
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court rarely overrules its own
precedents explicitly.94 Instead, it tends to justify a ruling that is in
tension with precedent (of which there have been a fair share) by
explaining that general-sounding rules announced in earlier cases
apply only to a much narrower set of circumstances95 or by attributing
any misunderstanding by lawyers or lower court judges to their failure

92. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for
Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1233–40 (2001); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927–34 (1998);
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1009, 1024 (1997).
93. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Debate on State Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 603–
04 (2002) (arguing that indeterminacy helps Delaware fend off federal intervention). Bebchuk
and Hamdani view indeterminacy as helping Delaware hide the extent to which its law favors
managers and the extent to which it changes the law to respond to the fear of federal
intervention. Id. at 603. By contrast, we view indeterminacy as reinforcing the technocratic gloss
of judge-made law.
94. A LexisNexis search in the Delaware Supreme Court database using the search term
“overrule” has revealed no instance in the last 20 years in which the court overruled its own
corporate law precedent. It did, however, reveal ten decisions in other areas in which the court
overruled its own precedent. See, e.g., Pub. Water Supply Co. v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 382
(Del. 1999) (overruling a 1994 decision regarding judicial review of administrative agencies).
95. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985) (noting that
directors may consider “the impact [of a takeover bid] on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders
[i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally]” in resisting a
bid), with Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (faulting directors for
taking into account the adverse impact of bid on noteholders, whose rights “were fixed by
contract” and therefore “required no further protection,” and explaining that board may consider
other constituencies only if “there are rationally related benefits accruing to stockholders”).
Compare In re Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., Litig. 634, A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993) (“In Delaware existing
law and policy have evolved into a virtual per se rule of damages for breach of the fiduciary duty
of disclosure.”), with Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 141 (Del. 1997)
(“Tri-Star stands only for the narrow proposition that, where directors have breached their
disclosure duties in a corporate transaction that has in turn caused impairment to the economic
or voting rights of stockholders, there must at least be an award of nominal damages.”).
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to read supreme court precedent carefully.96 Similarly, supreme court
justices in Delaware rarely dissent.97
Consistent with the presentation of Delaware law as a body of
stable, clear, uncontroversial, and easy-to-follow standards laid down
in a body of precedent, the court reacts harshly when directors’ actions
fail to measure up. In such instances, judicial opinions highlight these
failures in preachy, moralistic terms.98 Deficiencies in the conduct of
directors—whether because of ill-will, lack of backbone, or at the least
incompetence—are presented as constituting a failure for which
punishment is warranted (and not, say, to a reasonable, good-faith
interpretation of what prior judicial decisions require), and directors
are regularly pilloried for such failures by the Delaware Supreme
Court.99
C. The Making of Delaware’s Statutory Law
Although formally adopted by the legislature, Delaware’s
elected representatives have no significant role in crafting Delaware’s
96. Compare Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (noting that in a freezeout
merger, the plaintiff’s “monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to . . . appraisal”), with
Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985) (reversing the
chancery court’s application of that principle and faulting it for adopting a “narrow
interpretation of Weinberger [that] would render meaningless our extensive discussion of fair
dealing found in that opinion”). Compare Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989) (noting the chancery court held that the Time-Warner merger agreement did not result in
change of control because control remained in fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders, but
explicitly premising its holding on different ground, i.e., absence of a break), with Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Networks Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (endorsing the rationale offered by
the chancery court in Time and noting that defendants “misread” earlier cases and “totally
ignore” portions of their language). See also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110,
1116 (Del. 1994) (resolving conflict in chancery court as to effect of approval by special committee
by noting that a “definitive answer” can be found in earlier supreme court opinions); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.34 (Del. 1988) (“Following Revlon,
there appeared to be a degree of ‘scholarly’ debate about the particular fiduciary duty that had
been breached in that case, i.e., the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. In [Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)], we made it abundantly clear that both
duties were involved in Revlon, and that both had been breached.”) (emphasis added).
97. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV.
127, 132 (1997) (noting the low rate of dissents, in absolute terms and compared to other states).
98. See Rock, supra note 92, at 1016 (describing the opinions of Delaware courts as
“‘corporate law sermons’”).
99. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429–30 (Del. 1997) (noting that disinterested
directors “abdicated their responsibility” and “default[ed] on their obligation to remain fully
informed”); QVC, 637 A.2d at 50 (stating that the directors of Paramount “remained prisoners of
their own misconceptions”); Mills, 559 A.2d at 1280 (describing the board of Macmillan as
“torpid, if not supine”); Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1106 (noting that the special board committee of
Hunt directors engaged in a “quick surrender” when faced with a squeeze-out offer by Hunt’s
controlling shareholder); Rock, supra note 92, at 1028–60 (detailing other instances in which
Delaware courts castigated actions by directors).
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statutory corporate law. It is the Council of the Corporation Law
Section of the Delaware Bar Association, rather than a legislative
committee,100 that prepares drafts of proposed amendments to the
General Corporation Law.101 These proposals are often instigated by
lawyers who have encountered an ambiguity or a technical problem in
the statute that they want to have clarified or corrected. After the
Corporation Law Section has developed a proposal, it is submitted to
the legislature. Delaware’s legislature then typically adopts the
proposed amendments. Neither a legislative committee nor the
legislature as a body changes the proposal or debates its merits, and
the vote on the proposed amendment tends to be unanimous.102
Legislators claim no expertise over corporate law, and partisan politics
play no role in its formation.103
Even within the Delaware bar, proposed amendments hardly
ever generate controversy.104 One reason is that the Corporation Law
Section endeavors to make the necessary compromises to reach a
100. The Delaware Senate has twenty-six committees; the House has twenty-eight
committees. Official Website of the State of Delaware, http://www.legis.state.de.us/Legislature.
nsf/?Opendatabase (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
101. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 898 (1990).
102. This is not the uniform mode for legislation in Delaware. In other areas, bills are
amended in the legislative process, pass with dissent, or are defeated. See, e.g., H.R. 15, 142d
Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Del. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.
NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?open (choose House Bill from
Bill Type drop-down menu and type correct number in Bill Number field; then click Go! button)
(last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (showing several proposed amendments to the bill on smoking
regulation and noting its eventual defeat in the Senate); H.R. 24, 142d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess.
(Del. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.de.us/LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?open
frameset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?open (choose House Bill from Bill Type drop-down
menu and type correct number in Bill Number field; then click Go! button) (last visited Oct. 17,
2005) (noting the Senate defeat of a bill clarifying crime of offering false instrument for filing);
H.R. 182, 142d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Del. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.de.us/
LEGISLATURE.NSF/Archieves/?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/lis/lis142.nsf/?open (choose
House Bill from Bill Type drop-down menu and type correct number in Bill Number field; then
click Go! button) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (showing a divided committee report on and several
amendments to a bill on health care negligence suits). That Delaware’s Constitution requires a
two-thirds majority for changes in the corporate law does not account for the lack of dissent or
defeat, since supermajority requirements make it easier to defeat a bill and thus create
incentives to dissent. DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
Nor is this the uniform mode for corporate law legislation in states other than Delaware. See
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 732 (describing the significant political controversy over the
section of New York law imposing personal liability on large shareholders for wage claims);
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Michigan Senate Approves Change in Takeover Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2003, at C4 (noting that a bill protecting the Taubman family’s right to block a takeover of its
shopping mall company by Simon Property Group was passed 24–14 after an amendment to the
bill that would have enabled the bidder to continue its takeover effort was defeated 19–19).
103. Alva, supra note 101, at 898.
104. See id. at 909–13 (using the involuntary redemption statute as a case study).
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consensus. For example, a significant amount of bargaining took place
within the Council over the precise scope of Section 102(b)(7) in order
to generate an unanimous proposal for the legislature to act upon.105
The ultimate reason for the lack of controversy over statutory
amendments, however, is that, although Delaware regularly revises
its corporate law, most amendments address minor or technical issues.
Consider, for example, the 1999 amendments to the DGCL, which
made changes to ten sections.106 Six of the changes concern only
nonstock corporations107 or deal with the conversion of a corporation
into a domestic LLC, a limited partnership, or a business trust (with
unanimous shareholder approval), and vice versa.108 The remaining
four amendments address the following:
• Section 102(a) (name of corporations) was changed to provide
that punctuation in terms such as “Ltd.” is optional and that
foreign terms designating corporate existence are acceptable as
part of the name.
• Section 202 (transfer restrictions) was changed to clarify that
restrictions may be placed on the amount of stock owned by
any person, that a restriction may obligate a holder to sell
restricted securities or provide for an automatic sale, and that
restrictions imposed to qualify as a REIT are presumed to be
reasonable.
• Section 251(g) (mergers with wholly-owned subsidiaries to
create a holding company) was changed to clarify that the
directors of the surviving company may be changed without
vote by the shareholders of the holding company.
• Section 253 (short-form merger) was changed to clarify that the
90 percent ownership prerequisite for short-form mergers
applies only to classes of outstanding shares that would, but for
that section, be entitled to vote on the merger.
Thus, none of the 1999 amendments relate to corporate
governance, fiduciary duties, or other core issues of corporate law, and
105. Id. at 914–15.
106. Act of July 2, 1999, ch. 123 (Del. Adv. Legis. Serv., LEXIS through Sept. 6, 2005).
107. Section 170 (dividends) was changed to clarify that nonstock corporations can declare
dividends whether they are for profit or not for profit. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2005).
Section 242 (charter amendment) was modified to eliminate the requirement of two meetings by
the governing body of a nonstock corporation to adopt a charter amendment. Id. § 242(b)(3).
Section 255 (merger of nonstock corporations) lowers the approval threshold from two-thirds to a
majority of members, thus conforming to the threshold for stock corporations. Id. § 255(c).
108. A new section, 266, permits a conversion by a corporation; another new section, 265,
permits a conversion into a corporation; and amendments to Section 391 provide for fees for
these conversions. Id. §§ 266, 265, 391(a)(25)–(26).
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none could even remotely be anticipated to generate public debate or
controversy. Although statutory amendments occasionally venture
somewhat further afield from the technical,109 the 1999 amendments
typify Delaware’s legislative changes to its corporation law.110
D. Distinctive Features of Delaware’s Judiciary
Delaware’s judiciary—the generator and, as discussed below,
the primary enforcer of this distinctive law—is itself peculiar in
several respects. First, as noted above, Delaware is the only state that
has a specialized corporate trial court, the Court of Chancery, which
decides cases without juries.111 Usually, several of the five supreme
court justices (at present, three) are former members of the chancery
court. Thus, both on the trial and the appeals court level, corporate
cases are decided by a specialized judiciary.

109. For example, in a 1998 amendment, Section 251(c) was changed so that the merger
agreement could “require that the agreement be submitted to the stockholders whether or not
the board of directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its advisability that the
agreement is no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject it.” Act of June
29, 1998, ch. 339, § 44 (Del. Adv. Legis. Serv. LEXIS through Sept. 6, 2005) (codified at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2005)). Of course, under federal law and Delaware fiduciary duty law,
the directors would have to inform shareholders of their revised views and of the basis for these
views. Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that directors violate their fiduciary
duties by including such a requirement in the merger agreement when shareholders lack the
effective ability to block the merger in the shareholder vote. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 937 (Del. 2003). This holding greatly limits the practical
significance of the amendment with regard to merger agreements that lose board support but
retain shareholder support.
110. By contrast, laws in other states address more substantive issues. For example, in 1999,
several states amended substantive provisions of their corporation laws. Maryland enacted the
Maryland Unsolicited Takeover Act, ch. 300, 1999 Md. Laws 300 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 3-801–3-805 (2005)), which includes several potent anti-takeover
defenses, including the endorsement of a slow-hand pill, the application of the business judgment
rule to takeover defenses, and the power of a board to adopt a staggered board without
shareholder approval. See Subramanian, supra note 68, at 1864–66. Georgia amended its
corporate law to sanction dead-hand pills. See Xueqing Linda Ji, A New Look at Dead-Hand
Provisions In Poison Pills: Are They Per Se Invalid After Toll Brothers and Quickturn?, 44 ST.
LOUIS L.J. 223, 263 (2000). Georgia also amended its business combination statute to provide
that one does not become an interested shareholder as a result of shares tendered in a tender
offer (until the shares are accepted) or as a result of a proxy solicited in a proxy solicitation to ten
or more persons. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1110(4)(c) (2005). The Model Business Corporation Act
was amended to eliminate appraisal rights for charter amendments, provide a market out, and
change the standard for shareholder approval of asset sales from “substantially all” to a more
concrete test. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 12.02(a), 13.02(a) (2005). Obviously, these examples are
just illustrative and do not prove that substantive amendments to corporate codes are less
common in Delaware than in other states.
111. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 708.
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Second, compared both to judges in other states and to federal
judges, Delaware’s judiciary is nonpoliticized.112 Delaware is one of
only eight states in which judges are selected based on merit by a
In
nominating commission and face no elections thereafter.113
addition, Delaware’s constitution mandates a partisan balance in the
supreme court and the overall judiciary.114
To be sure, unlike federal judges, Delaware judges serve a
limited term.115 But just as with initial appointment decisions,
reappointment decisions are nonpoliticized. In modern times, there
has only been one judge, Justice Andrew Moore, who wanted to get
reappointed, but failed. The reason for this failure, however, is
unrelated to his politics or his jurisprudence. Rather, Justice Moore,
while praised for his intellectual prowess, is said to have lost favor
among the corporate bar because he was perceived as “arrogant,
acerbic, sanctimonious and upbraiding.”116
Finally, to a greater extent than is typical for members of the
judiciary, Delaware judges propagate their vision outside the court
room. Delaware judges publish an extraordinary amount of extrajudicial writing.117 Members of Delaware’s judiciary also regularly
112. See also Skeel, supra note 97, at 134 (describing the judicial appointment process as
apolitical because it “is largely divorced from party politics in practice”).
113. THE LAWYER’S ALMANAC J-5–J-12 (2005).
114. DEL. CONST. art IV, § 3.
115. LAWYER’S ALMANAC, supra note 113, at J-5–J-12.
116. Karen Donovan, Shareholders’ Advocates Protest Justice’s Removal, NATL. L.J., June 6,
1994, at B1, B2; see also John Close & Nicholas Varchaver, Justice Denied in Delaware, AM.
LAW., July-Aug. 1994, at 23, 23 (noting that Justice Moore, “the author of a string of seminal
opinions,” was prone to hand out “‘harsh chastisement of attorneys,’” “‘projected a sense of
arrogance,’” and engaged in “‘ad hominem’” questioning during oral argument).
117. The following is an incomplete list of such writings by current (and very recently
retired) members of the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery: William T. Allen, Jack
B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation On Bridging the
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002); William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy:
A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV.
449 (2002); William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and
Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083 (1999); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine,
Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections
of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003); Randy J. Holland, State
Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 989 (1996); Randy J. Holland, State Jury
Trials and Federalism: Constitutionalizing Common Law Concepts, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 373
(2004); Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Independence with Accountability,
5 WIDENER. L. SYMP. J. 117 (2000); Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases
Without Controversy, 5 DEL. L. REV. 115 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law
System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response
to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
1257 (2001); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of
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participate in professional meetings, attend academic conferences, and
give lectures to corporate directors.118 For example, Delaware judges
regularly appear at the annual Tulane Corporate Law Institute: at the
2004 conference, Justices Veasey, Steele, and Jacobs from the
Delaware Supreme Court and Vice-Chancellor Strine from the
Chancery Court were all present.119
E. The Reliance on Private Enforcement
Another notable trait of Delaware’s corporate law is that it is
enforced exclusively through private lawsuits. Delaware has no
regulatory agency that either examines compliance with corporate law
or enforces its corporate law through fines, injunctions, or cease-anddesist orders; the state does not enforce corporate norms through
criminal proceedings; and even though the Attorney General has some
civil enforcement powers with respect to for-profit corporations,120
these powers are virtually never exercised.121
Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Charge of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There”
There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2002); E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in a
Post Enron/Worldcom Environment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 731 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, The
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation in Responding to
Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or Agents, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2002); E. Norman
Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in Corporate Law, 1 DEL. L. REV.
169 (1998); E. Norman Veasey, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key Issues of
Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2002); E. Norman
Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate Transactions, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1
(2002); E. Norman Veasey, The Many Facets of Judicial Independence Diamond, 20 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 779 (2001); E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics of Corporate Governance
Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate
Governance Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 2135 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key
Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2003); E. Norman Veasey, The Roles of the Delaware Courts in Merger
and Acquisition Litigation, Speech Presented at the Fourth Annual Mergers and Acquisitions
Insight Information Co. (June 18, 2001), in 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2001); E. Norman Veasey,
Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices—or Vice
Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179 (2001); E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate
Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441 (2003).
118. Interestingly, while the Delaware Court of Chancery does not keep track systematically
of chancellors’ speeches or public appearances, the SEC provides a website with links to speeches
and public statements of commissioners and staff. See U.S. SEC, Commission Speeches and
Public Statements, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2005).
119. Indeed, the brochure’s promised benefits include the opportunity to “learn from and
interact with members of the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery.” Brochure,
Tulane University Law School Sixteenth Annual Corporate Law Institute, March 2004 (on file
with author).
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 124(3), 284(a) (2005).
121. A search in Westlaw’s Delaware Business Organization Case Law file revealed three
cases involving charitable corporations in which the Attorney General took some action.
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In striking contrast to this lack of public enforcement,
Delaware has taken great care in developing a first-rate system for
private enforcement. It is the only state in the nation that has a
specialized corporate court, the Court of Chancery. This court is wellfunded, enjoys wide respect, resolves disputes speedily, and probably
accounts for the fact that Delaware’s overall court system is ranked
first among all states.122 If needed, appeals from the Court of
Chancery are heard by the Delaware Supreme Court quickly and
decided promptly after oral argument.123 Moreover, Delaware takes
pains to ensure that the chancery court has the personal jurisdiction
that it needs in order to resolve corporate disputes involving Delaware
corporations.
Thus, when the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the statutory basis for Delaware’s personal jurisdiction as
inconsistent with due process,124 thereby threatening the ability of the
chancery court to resolve corporate disputes, Delaware passed a new
statute within 13 days establishing a different statutory basis for its
jurisdiction over corporate directors.125 More recently, in light of the
trend by public corporations to have only a few officers serve on the
board of directors, Delaware expanded its personal jurisdiction statute
to include a corporation’s senior or most highly compensated officers,
whether or not they are members of the board of directors.126
This focus on private enforcement is distinctive both from the
international and the national perspective. Internationally, corporate
law rules are to a large extent publicly enforced. Public enforcement
agents include the securities regulators of various countries; the Panel
on Takeovers and Mergers, which enforces the U.K. City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers; and prosecutors, who, in Continental Europe,
bring criminal proceedings against misbehavior by corporate
executives (including actions that would be regarded in the United
States as, at most, civil breaches of fiduciary duties).127 Within the
Otherwise, the Attorney General appeared in corporate disputes only as a defendant in cases
challenging the constitutionality of Delaware’s anti-takeover law.
122. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 708 n.95.
123. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Networks Inc., 637 A.2d 828 (1993) (providing the
court’s order resolving dispute, which is dated same day as the oral argument).
124. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216–17 (1977) (holding that Delaware’s quasi-in-rem
statute was not a valid basis for its exercise of jurisdiction over directors and officers of Delaware
corporations).
125. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 714 n.117 (deeming directors to have consented
to jurisdiction).
126. Frederick H. Alexander, Significant Amendments Made to Delaware Corporation Law,
35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1331, 1333 (Aug. 11, 2003).
127. For example, several sections of the German Aktienrecht and U.K. company law impose
criminal penalties and fines for misconduct. See, e.g., Aktiengesetz [AktG, Stock Corporation Act]
§§ 399 (false statements) and 404 (violation of duty of confidentiality); Companies Act 1985, c. 6,
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United States, corporate law rules adopted through the federal
securities laws are enforced publicly, either on an exclusive basis or
concurrent with private enforcement.128 Similarly, stock exchanges, to
the extent that they enforce listing requirements designed to protect
shareholders, can be regarded as quasi-public third-party enforcement
agents. Finally, a plethora of publicly-enforced state and federal
laws—such as the Trust Indenture Act,129 the Investment Company
Act,130 the Investment Advisers Act,131 and state Blue Sky laws132—
protect investors against overreaching by bond issuers, managers of
mutual funds, brokers, and issuers of securities.
To be sure, other states are not necessarily more active than
Delaware is in enforcing corporate laws publicly. But none of the
other states has any significant stake in its corporate law, and none of
the other states has developed sophisticated structures for the private
enforcement of its corporate laws comparable to Delaware’s.133
Moreover, some states publicly prosecute corporate misconduct, albeit
under the guise of their criminal, rather than their corporate, law.
Recently, for example, the Manhattan District Attorney charged
Dennis Kozlowski, the CEO, and two other officers of Tyco
International with grand larceny and violations of the general
business law for looting the company through excessive compensation
pt. X, § 342 (Eng.) (criminalizing the extension of loans to directors in violation of Company Act).
For a particularly high-profile and dramatic example, see the current criminal prosecution of
Josef Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche Bank, over his approval as a director of Mannesmann of a
bonus to Mannesmann’s CEO at the conclusion of the control battle with Vodafone. See, e.g.,
Mark Landler, Banker Faces German Court Over Pay Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2004, at C1;
Marcus Walker, After Huge Merger, German CEO Faces Trial Over Payout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6,
2003, at A1; see also Santander Chairman Ordered to Stand Trial, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28. 2004, at
C2 (reporting that three executives of a Spanish bank were being tried for arranging generous
severance packages for some of the bank’s former executives).
128. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2005) (empowering
SEC to investigate violations of and enforce provisions of Securities Exchange Act); Pitt Cites
Record Number of Financial Reporting Actions, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP (BNA) 1747 (Oct. 28, 2002)
(noting that SEC brought 163 actions for financial reporting and issuer disclosure violations in
fiscal year 2002).
129. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77aaa–77bbbb (2005)).
130. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64 (2005)).
131. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2005)).
132. E.g., Uniform Securities Act (amended 2002), 7C U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2005) (listing states
that have already adopted the Act).
133. No state has a corporate court similar to Delaware’s chancery court. See Kahan &
Kamar, supra note 38, at 708–15 (discussing other states’ less successful efforts to establish
business courts). Only twelve other states have consent statutes relating to directors that are
similar to Delaware’s and, to our knowledge, no other state has a consent statute relating to
officers. See id. at 714 n.113.
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or taking unauthorized loans—classic self-dealing transactions by a
corporate fiduciary.134 And, with a federal investigation pending,
Oklahoma’s Attorney General filed criminal charges against former
WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers and five others for defrauding the
state’s pension funds and other investors.135 Delaware, the domicile of
choice for public firms, can and did extend its criminal jurisdiction to
similar misconduct harming Delaware corporations136—yet we are not
aware of any instances in which Delaware prosecutors have
investigated or charged corporate officials. Thus, even relative to
other states, Delaware’s focus on private enforcement stands out.
F. The Scope of Corporate Law
The scope of Delaware’s corporate law includes the regulation
of the internal affairs of the corporation and concerns the powers,
rights, and duties of the corporation, its shareholders, officers, and
directors. Delaware’s corporate law, however, largely does not address
matters beyond the internal affairs of the corporation. Although the
scope of Delaware’s law in this respect is similar to the scope of
corporate law in other states in the United States, it differs from the
scope of corporate law in other countries. U.K. company law, for
example, prohibits carrying out a business under a misleading
name,137 imposes a duty on a corporation to identify its name and
characteristics in dealing with outsiders,138 regulates debentures,139
and deals with security interests.140 In the United States, these issues
are addressed by different bodies of state or federal law.141
Within the confines of internal affairs, Delaware corporate law
broadly covers most areas: the creation and dissolution of a
corporation; the powers of a corporation; the decisionmaking powers of
shareholders, directors, and officers; shareholder voting; and the
134. News Release, District Attorney-New York County, supra note 4.
135. Oklahoma Files First Criminal Charges Against WorldCom, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug.
23, 2003, at 19; see also Former Qwest Chairman Anschutz to Pay $4.4M in N.Y. State Spinning
Case, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 857 (May 19, 2003) (noting settlement by corporate executive
of charges brought by N.Y. Attorney General that he received profitable allocations of IPO shares
from Salomon Smith Barney “as an inducement or reward for investment banking business”
from the company).
136. Delaware criminal law applies to offenses where the result occurs in Delaware or to
conspiracies where at least one overt act occurs within Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§
204(a)(1)–(2) (2005).
137. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, pt. I, c. II, § 33 (Eng.).
138. Id. pt. XI, c. I, §§ 348–351.
139. Id. pt. V, c. VIII, §§ 190–195.
140. Id. pt. XII, c. I, §§ 395–409.
141. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-101 et seq. (2005) (dealing with secured transactions).
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obligations of corporate fiduciaries.142 In general terms, Delaware
corporate law (though not necessarily the laws of other U.S. states)
also covers much of the same territory as the federal securities laws,
though it does so in a rather different manner. Federal law, for
example, requires public companies to disclose a wide array of
information, on a regular basis or in relation to a vote.143 Delaware
law also governs the company’s disclosure of information. But rather
than imposing specific disclosure requirements, Delaware law
requires a company to disclose all material information when
shareholders are asked to vote or to take other actions144 and grants
shareholders a general right to inspect the company’s books and
records for a proper purpose.145 Federal law, including stock exchange
rules sanctioned by the SEC, requires the board of directors of public
corporations, including certain committees, to contain specified
percentages of independent directors. Delaware law also governs
board composition.
But rather than the stick of mandated
requirements, Delaware law uses the carrot of granting greater legal
protections to properly constituted boards.146 Federal law prohibits
certain forms of coercion and discrimination in tender offers.147
Delaware law subjects coercion and discrimination by the corporation
to legal scrutiny for breach of fiduciary duty and permits a board wide
latitude in defending itself against a coercive offer by a third party.148
Federal law criminalizes insider trading and creates a private right of
action on behalf of investors.149 Delaware law creates a right of action
on the part of the company, enforceable through a derivative suit by
shareholders.150
142. See, e.g., notes 48–62, supra, and accompanying text.
143. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41
DUKE L.J. 977, 982–83 (1992). Federal disclosure rules also apply to a company that seeks to
issue shares. Id. at 983 & n.22. Delaware has no equivalent rules, presumably due to the fact
that a sale of shares is outside the internal affairs of a company.
144. See Erickson v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular LLC, No. 19974, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS
38, at *13–*16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2003) (holding that the disclosure statement in a short-form
merger did not comply with requirement to disclose all material information related to the
merger to permit shareholders to make an informed decision on whether to exercise their
appraisal rights).
145. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (2005).
146. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).
147. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (2005).
148. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957–58 (Del. 1985).
149. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1980); but see Securities Exchange
Act, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2005) (providing statutory insider trading provisions that enable
private, derivative-suit-like enforcement mechanism).
150. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (1949) (“When . . . a person ‘in a confidential
or fiduciary position, in breach of his duty, uses his knowledge to make a profit for himself, he is
accountable for such profit’”) (citation omitted); Guttman v. Huang, 828 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch.
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These differences in approach between Delaware and federal
law, of course, are related to the distinctive traits of Delaware law. As
noted before, much of Delaware law is judge-made and privately
enforced. But the development of specific disclosure requirements, of
mandated rules of board composition, of criminal violations, and even
of inflexible per se rules on coercion and discrimination is hard to
mesh with traditional modes of judge-made law, and specifically with
the modes of privately enforced, judge-made corporate law in
Delaware. Because of the distinctive traits of Delaware law, its
regulation of disclosure, board composition, coercive tender offers, and
insider trading, though striking in the same direction, takes a form
different from federal law.
III. DELAWARE’S TRAITS AS ADAPTATIONS TO THE POLITICAL
LANDSCAPE
The various traits of Delaware corporate law discussed in the
last Part should all be viewed through the lens of the institutional and
political landscape in which Delaware must operate. Delaware
operates in a federal system in which its regulatory powers co-exist
with and can be constrained by the powers of the federal government
and the various other states. In this system, Delaware is faced with
an omnipresent, albeit not imminent, specter of a federal takeover.
Such a takeover could make Delaware corporate law irrelevant, or at
least greatly diminish the price companies are willing to pay to
incorporate in Delaware, and thus eradicate the huge profits Delaware
derives from being the domicile of choice for publicly-traded U.S.
corporations. Indeed, given the historic failure of states to take
significant measures to compete with Delaware for incorporations,151
the possibility of federal preemption of state corporate law due to
populist pressure probably constitutes the single most important

2003) (citing to Brophy for the proposition that “Delaware law has long held . . . that directors
who misuse corporate information to profit at the expense of innocent buyers of their stock
should disgorge their profit.”). As of late, Delaware seems to have become an easier venue for
plaintiffs to pursue insider trading clams than the federal courts. See In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 921, 923 (Del. Ch. 2003) (refusing to dismiss derivative insider
trading claim upon recommendation of special litigation committee even where similar direct
claims under federal law have been dismissed for failure to meet the federal pleading
requirements).
151. See generally Kahan & Kamar, supra note 38, at 684, 701–24 (supporting empirically
the claim that “[o]ther than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to attract
incorporation of public companies”).
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threat to Delaware’s profits from the franchising business.152
Moreover, embedded in this federal system are rules on personal
jurisdiction and on conflict of laws which constrain Delaware’s ability
to regulate certain types of corporate conduct effectively. In this Part,
we explain the traits of Delaware corporate law as modes of
adaptation to this landscape.
A. Embracing Common Law Classicism: The Creative Use of
Anachronism?
There is something determinedly old-fashioned about Delaware
corporate law.
The most superficial feature is the pomp and
ceremony, the celebration of old distinctions such as that between law
and equity, the attention to tradition.153 But it goes much deeper.
Delaware corporate law may be the last vestige of the 19th century
common law style in America.
The traits of Delaware corporate law described above are
striking in part because they represent a rather pure, and therefore
rather unfamiliar, form of the common law system. It is worth
pausing for a moment to appreciate just how much of a throwback
Delaware is. The relationship between the Delaware judiciary and
legislature exemplifies the traditional relationship between a common
law judiciary and the legislature, and illustrates one of the traditional
differences between a common law jurisdiction and a code jurisdiction.
The dominance of the judiciary in making law, and the judiciary’s
stubborn insistence on its primacy in relation to legislation, was
already described, explored, and ultimately decried by Roscoe Pound
in his classic 1908 article Common Law & Legislation.154 Pound
famously attacked the attitude that lay behind the 19th century
American common law judicial precept that “statutes in derogation of
the common law shall be narrowly construed.”155 Similarly, in
thinking about Delaware through Hart and Sacks’s conceptual
framework, one is struck by the extent to which Delaware corporate
152. See Roe, supra note 6, at 600 (noting that Delaware’s chief competitive pressure comes
not from other states, but from the federal government); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 93, at
558 (same).
153. See, e.g., Delaware State Courts, Overview of the Delaware State Court System at
http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) (describing the Court of Chancery
as having “jurisdiction to hear all matters relating to equity”). See also DELAWARE SUPREME
COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951–2001 (Randy Holland & Helen Winslow eds., 2001) (tracing
the history of Delaware courts since before 1776 and discussing their precedents in a variety of
legal areas).
154. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
155. Id.
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law reflects a pre–New Deal understanding: no administrative
agencies, private enforcement, and incremental legislation from an
otherwise largely passive legislature. And although never explicitly
stated, the precept that “statutes in derogation of judge-made law
shall be narrowly construed” offers a good guide to Delaware’s
corporate law jurisprudence.156
And yet we (including the Delaware judges and lawyers) are all
moderns.
We all know that we live in the post-New Deal
administrative state. We have all learned the lessons that the Legal
Realist taught157 and that Critical Legal Studies reemphasized:158 that
law has an unavoidable political and moral aspect; that legal answers
are created, not discovered; that the law’s affectation of technocratic
expertise and neutrality is often a cover for political and normative
choices. We therefore cannot assume that Delaware’s embrace of the
19th century style is simply a naive (mis)understanding of the nature
of law.
What, then, could be behind this seemingly disingenuous
affectation? We argue that this old common law vision, with its
distinctive judicial virtues, is adaptive given Delaware’s vulnerable
position in the corporate lawmaking hierarchy. Just as the old
common law style has been explained as a way that politically weak
judges preserve their autonomy (or, less charitably, grab political
power), so too that style can serve to aid a politically weak state in
preserving its lawmaking autonomy within a larger political
landscape. By aligning itself with this history, Delaware gains
legitimacy.
B. Preserving the Technocratic and Apolitical Gloss
Several of the traits described above have the effect of creating
and enhancing a technocratic, apolitical gloss on Delaware law. The
public perception of Delaware’s corporate law as largely technocratic
and apolitical is important for Delaware as it helps fend off federal
intervention. As explained in Part I, Delaware has a legitimacy
problem: why should a little state make the national rules of corporate
law? By constructing its law as technocratic and apolitical, Delaware

156. See supra Part II.A.
157. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 32–41 (1935) (acknowledging
that judges “make and change the law” and attributing the contrary view—law as definitive
rules—to a “[c]hildish dread of uncertainty”).
158. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685, 1707–10, 1751–62 (1976) (explaining the necessity of judicial value judgments,
even when courts claim merely to be applying rules).
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deflects attention from the democratic deficit of its corporate law,
legitimizes its role as promulgator of the de facto national corporate
law, and reduces the likelihood of a populist challenge to its
preeminence.
Several traits of Delaware law contribute to this technocratic
and apolitical gloss. Consider first the breadth of judge-made
corporate law. Judge-made law tends to have more of a neutral,
apolitical aura than statutory law.159 Judges are more removed from
the political process, and professional norms require judges to give
reasoned opinions based on precedent, rather than simply doing what
they think is the right thing politically. In judicial reasoning in
general, and Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence in particular,
partisan conflicts are not openly discussed, monetary contributions
are supposed to play no role, lobbying takes the form of technical legal
briefs, and political choices are swept under the carpet.
To the extent that corporate law rules are judge-made, the fact
that it is Delaware judges rather than federal judges who make the
rules does not much detract from the legitimacy of these rules. Judges
lack obvious democratic legitimacy in any event. Rather, judicial
decisions and judge-made law can be thought to derive legitimacy in
the public eye160 from neutral, nonpartisan, and technical “legal”
reasoning. In other words, in the public perception, federal and
Delaware judges are largely interchangeable, or at least much more so
than federal and Delaware legislators would be. Indeed, since
Delaware’s judiciary is less politicized and has greater claims to
expertise in corporate law than the federal judiciary, its rulings may
enjoy greater legitimacy than would corporate rulings of federal
judges.
The style of Delaware’s judge-made law further enhances the
notion that the law is technocratic and apolitical. Delaware’s supreme
court eschews overruling its own precedent and dissenting opinions.161
Instead, Delaware Supreme Court opinions adopt a quasideterministic reasoning according to which any disagreements with
the Court of Chancery or corporate actors are due to faulty legal
reasoning or moral shortcomings by others. This serves to gloss over
the fact that reasonable minds may differ on how an issue ought to be
159. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 93, at 604 (noting that reliance on judge-made,
rather than legislative, law reduces Delaware’s legitimacy problem).
160. Even though many modern legal scholars and practitioners are aware that judicial
reasoning is often just a veneer that masks important and controversial decisions of a political
nature, the relevant political sphere here is not legal scholars and practitioners, but the general
public, which is much less aware or comfortable with judges making political choices.
161. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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resolved and that the outcome of disputes depends not just on the
decisionmaker’s technical skills but on her policy preferences.
The lack of public enforcement further reduces the state’s
visible role in the administration of its corporate law. Rather than
two state bodies (one that brings actions and another that resolves
disputes), only one body, the judiciary, is involved. Delaware thus has
no room for (over)eager, or overly lax, and possibly politically
motivated law enforcers in the tradition of Eliot Spitzer,162 Rudy
Giuliani,163 or Harvey Pitt.164 Delaware, of course, does have courts
and judges.
But judges are brought to the fore through the
decentralized activities of private actors rather than on their own
motion; they lack the power and the staff to conduct investigations;
and they are supposed to exercise restraint in commenting on
disputes. Delaware’s judiciary, in particular, is highly respected for
its technocratic expertise and represents a model of nonpartisanship.
The focus on enforcement of Delaware corporate law through actions
initiated by private parties and resolved by Delaware courts thus
supports the apolitical and technocratic image of the law.

162. See, e.g., Michael Slackman & Marc Santora, Spitzer, Sounding Gubernatorial,
Discusses the State of the State, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at B8 (“Since his election as attorney
general, Mr. Spitzer has worked quietly and efficiently to position himself for a run for governor,
taking on issues—like Wall Street corruption—that have given him a national spotlight while
also working to build grassroots support across the state.”).
The recent wave of outrage about Wall Street’s behavior began, you may recall, when
New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer deployed an obscure state law to
shoehorn out of Merrill Lynch every e-mail message Merrill employees had ever sent
relating to the Internet boom. It was easy to see why Spitzer chose Merrill Lynch as his
target. He has political ambitions (he wants to be governor of New York, at least), and
unlike Goldman, Sachs or Morgan Stanley or one of the other big investment banks
more central to the Internet bubble, Merrill actually serviced lots of small customers.
It’s a firm that voters can relate to.
Michael Lewis, In Defense of the Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002 (Magazine), at 44.
163. See, e.g., Catherine S. Manegold, A Road of Many Turns, an End Triumphant, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993, at B3:
Campaigning for mayor, Mr. Giuliani always said his quest was a natural progression
in a career that took him from the Federal prosecutor’s office in Manhattan to the No.
3 official in the Reagan Justice Department and finally United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York. . . .
. . . He became famous for his prosecution of organized crime figures and insider
trading. The names Milken, Boesky and Drexel-Burnham Lambert were linked with
his after he led a series of assaults against Wall Street’s excesses.
164. Harvey Pitt, who had been hailed on his appointment as chair of the SEC, was
ultimately forced to resign in the wake of accusations of laxity in response to the corporate and
accounting scandals. Stephen Labaton, Praise to Scorn: Mercurial Ride of S.E.C. Chief, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at A1 (mentioning the unusual speed with which the SEC filed fraud
charges against WorldCom).
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The extra-cameral activities by members of the Delaware
judiciary also mesh well with Delaware’s political interests.165 These
activities help market Delaware law to the legal community; let judges
obtain information about the views of practitioners and academics;
and enable the judiciary to amplify its admonitions to directors to
comport with the judiciary’s vision of proper corporate governance and
thus beef up Delaware’s enforcement regime. In all these respects,
they make Delaware more attractive as an incorporation haven. But,
from our perspective, they also serve an additional function: they
create an outlet for dissatisfaction with legal rulings and permit
individual members of the judiciary to refine, confine, and maybe even
signal a retreat from the court’s holdings. The need for this outlet is
created by the fact that members of Delaware’s judiciary cannot be
directly lobbied; that practicing lawyers may be reluctant to criticize
judicial rulings openly; and that the judiciary lacks control over its
docket and thus may value the opportunity to clarify its holdings
before the next case involving that issue arises.
Even in the matters into which the legislature does intrude,
Delaware law has—in this instance deservedly—a technocratic and
apolitical appearance. Proposed laws are adopted without amendment
or debate by overwhelming majorities. Any lobbying that takes place
occurs within the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware bar. Thus,
even within the legislative process, the dirty portions of politics either
do not exist or at least are not visible: campaign contributions,
partisanship, and even the special interests of local constituents have
no apparent effect on the law, and lobbying is channeled through a
professional, consensus-oriented body that meets outside the public’s
eye and self-consciously avoids taking on controversial issues.
This is not to say that Delaware politics are generally more
pure than elsewhere or that large in-state interests—be it large local
corporations such as DuPont or MBNA, or chicken farmers from the
southern part of the state—do not have significant influence in
Delaware politics. They do. But precisely because local Delaware
politics is impure, it is imperative for Delaware to ensure, as much as
possible, that the corporate lawmaking process is not, or is perceived
not to be, the product of ordinary politicking. Few things would do
more to undermine Delaware’s legitimacy than, say, a front-page
article in a major newspaper discussing how a large corporation got

165. See supra note 117.
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some controversial legislation passed by channeling substantial
campaign contributions to local politicians.166
C. The Minimization of Interjurisdictional Conflict
Another way that Delaware adapts to its position in the federal
system is to take account of the rules on personal jurisdiction and
conflict of laws to avoid interjurisdictional conflicts. Under the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, state courts can assert
jurisdiction only over defendants who have the requisite minimum
contacts with the forum state.167 Under prevailing rules on conflict of
laws, which are part of the law of each state, the law of the state of
incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation, but other
factors determine the law applicable to most other disputes. These
jurisdictional and conflict rules help explain the scope of Delaware’s
corporate law.
Consider, for a moment, how narrow Delaware’s corporate law
is. It is largely confined to the regulation of the internal affairs of the
corporation. This scope is due neither to some inherent understanding
of what corporate law is about (for example, U.K. company law
encompasses a number of other matters) nor to Delaware not being
able to offer a superior substantive product on other matters—because
of its quality courts and its responsiveness, it well could. Rather, it is
due to conflict of laws rules which would generally not point to the law
of the state of incorporation as governing matters outside the internal
affairs of the corporation.
Of course, Delaware could revise its own conflict rules to point
to Delaware law as governing matters outside the company’s internal
affairs. But Delaware could not force other states to do the same.
Thus, depending on whether a dispute is litigated in Delaware or a
different forum, the forum’s conflict rules would point to different
bodies of law, with possibly different substantive content. As a result,
parties would not know which substantive rules apply before a lawsuit
166. See Sorkin, supra note 102 (noting that intense lobbying effort by the Taubman family
led to the passage of legislation that would enable the family to block a hostile bid for its
shopping mall empire); Editorial, Spitzer v. Grasso, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2004, at A16
(suggesting that Spitzer failed to sue fellow Democrat Carl McCall, past chairman of the New
York Stock Exchange’s compensation committee during Grasso’s tenure, for political reasons).
167. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ . . . [The Due
Process Clause] does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam
against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations.”) (citation omitted).
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is brought. Even if Delaware law were substantively superior to the
law of other states, parties may well prefer to know with certainty
that they are governed by the (inferior) law of, say, Maryland, to
uncertainty over whether (inferior) Maryland law or (superior)
Delaware law applies.
Moreover, Delaware has a lot to lose from challenging the
prevailing rules on conflict of laws. If Delaware is perceived as being
overly aggressive in expanding its own law to areas that are not
traditionally subject to laws of the state of incorporation, other states
may respond by changing their conflict rules to limit the scope of the
internal affairs rule. The continued applicability of the internal
affairs rule is, of course, the life-blood of Delaware. Thus, Delaware
has no interest in pursuing a major change to the status quo of conflict
rules.
Furthermore, Delaware would only have a limited ability to
enforce many rules that would fall outside the internal affairs
doctrine. To enforce its law effectively, Delaware courts need personal
jurisdiction over the relevant defendants. Such jurisdiction would be
lacking, say, over a creditor who claims a security interest in the
company’s property—an issue regulated by U.K. company law but not
by Delaware corporation law.168
Limitations imposed by personal jurisdiction may even affect
how Delaware regulates internal affairs. For example, Delaware law
imposes no duties on shareholders (unless they are controlling
shareholders)169 to disclose information or on a bidder to structure
tender offers in a certain manner.170 Such rules may well complement
168. See supra Part II.F.
169. Though having control of a Delaware corporation is not a sufficient basis for personal
jurisdiction, individual controlling shareholders will often be directors and corporate controlling
shareholders will usually be under a duty to indemnify their representatives on the board of the
controlled company, and thus be subject to the de jure or de facto jurisdiction of the Delaware
courts. Grace Bros., Ltd. v. Uniholding Corp., No. 17612, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101, at *50–*55
(Del. Ch. July 12, 2000) (rejecting the argument that the controlling shareholder was an
indispensable party and exercising jurisdiction over individual directors who held a large stake
in controlling shareholder, noting that directors could seek indemnification or contribution from
the controlling shareholder in a separate action). Moreover, Delaware employs the far-reaching
conspiracy theory to obtain personal jurisdiction over controlling shareholders. See, e.g., Parfi
Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, 794 A.2d 1211, 1229–30 (Del. Ch. 2001) (basing
jurisdiction on conspiracy theory, which requires that a controlling shareholder participated in a
conspiracy and had reason to know that a substantial act or effect in furtherance of conspiracy
occurred in the forum state); Gibralt Capital Corp. v. Smith, No. 17422, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 60,
at *15–*20 (Del. Ch. May 8, 2001) (same).
170. Such duties do exist under U.S. federal law and U.K. company law. Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (2005); Company Act 1985, §§ 198–210A
(Eng.). Curiously, Delaware’s corporation law has a “reorganization” section that permits
companies to insert a clause in their charter that would permit a requisite majority of creditors

2005]

SYMBIOTIC FEDERALISM

1617

the governance structure established by Delaware’s corporate law.
But because being a shareholder of or a bidder for shares of a
Delaware corporation would not likely satisfy the constitutional
requirement of minimum contacts, Delaware courts would lack the
ability to enforce such duties effectively.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND EXPLORATIONS
A. Responding to Crises
Delaware corporate law’s adaptive adherence to the old
common law model carries inherent limitations that can bind
uncomfortably when crises arise. In this regard, contrast the different
responses to the post-Enron sense that “something must be done.”
Congress held hearings and ultimately enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. The SEC, on its own accord and in response to congressional
dictate, adopted new regulations and leaned on the stock exchanges to
reform their corporate governance standards for listed companies.171
Several states passed new laws or instituted criminal proceedings
against executives involved in the scandals.172
Compare this to Delaware. Its legislature did not act—it did
not hold any hearings and did not pass any legislation—because it
eschews controversy. No administrative agency promulgated new
rules because Delaware has no parallel to the SEC. No public
prosecutor went on the warpath against corporate wrong-doers
because Delaware corporate law is enforced by private actions. Given
Delaware’s traditional mode of addressing controversy, it had to wait
until a legal dispute was brought in its courts. Since no case was
brought, Delaware had no opportunity to address the recent scandals
directly. In short, Delaware has been out of the limelight.
This does not mean, however, that Delaware has been out of
the loop. It is much too early to tell what effect the recent scandals
will have on Delaware law. We will not know until, several years
hence, we look back and trace out the various ways in which the
(majority in number, three-quarters in value) to approve a compromise or arrangement that, if
approved by the court, would be binding on all creditors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(2) (2005)
(prescribing exact language). It is unlikely that the Delaware courts have the jurisdiction over
creditors to enforce this section and it does not appear that it is ever used. See RODMAN WARD,
JR. ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 102.10 (4th ed. 1999 & Supp.
2005) (citing no relevant cases in commentary on section).
171. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The SEC Takes
Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 93 (2005).
172. See supra notes 3 & 4.
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lessons of Enron, etc.—whatever they turn out to be—are,
incrementally and slowly, incorporated and expressed in Delaware
judicial review of board conduct.173
Some may lament that Delaware is slow to respond.174 But
that is to miss a very important point: Delaware’s slowness is part and
parcel of its adherence to a particular, traditional, reactive model of
judge-centered lawmaking. That adherence, as we have argued, is an
adaptation to the federalist landscape in which it operates. To deviate
in response to some felt necessity would probably be wrong headed. If
Delaware were to try to out-reform Congress and the SEC, it would be
bound to lose because of its inherent disadvantage in legitimating the
provision of national law.
Contrast, in this respect, Delaware’s passivity with the activity
of Eliot Spitzer, who managed to sideline the SEC on several fronts.
Spitzer is the Attorney General of one of the largest states, the
geographic home of the major stock exchanges, of the major
investment banks, and of numerous investors. As such, Spitzer’s
democratic legitimacy greatly exceeds Delaware’s. But much more
importantly, Spitzer, one suspects, is less concerned about preserving
New York’s long-term regulatory power than about dealing with the
current crisis and earning financial (for the state) and political (for
himself) rewards for being visibly on the ball while the SEC was
asleep. Thus, even if, as is likely, the SEC ultimately reasserts its
preeminence in regulating the securities industry and fends off future
interference by state regulators,175 Spitzer will come out a winner. By
173. We can already see some subtle signs that Delaware law will be changing. For example,
in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 942–48 (Del. Ch. 2003), Vice-Chancellor
Strine employed a narrow concept of independence—one that takes into account the fact that
interests that are not directly financial, such as collegiality among members of the same faculty
or charitable donations to a faculty member’s university, can impinge on one’s independence—in
refusing to dismiss a complaint upon the recommendation of a special litigation committee. And
in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 286–90 (Del. Ch. 2003), Chancellor
Chandler refused to dismiss a complaint that a senior officer received an overly generous
severance package on the grounds that the alleged lack of board involvement in structuring the
severance package may amount to lack of good faith and board members may thus not be
protected by Section 102(b)(7). In addition, the Delaware judiciary has been out on the hustings
trying to send a message. See, e.g., Chandler & Strine, supra note 117, at 1005–06 (urging that
courts “sensibly implement[]” the 2002 reforms and that states implement reforms of their own).
174. Others do not. See Romano, supra note 22, at 6–12, 215–16 (criticizing Congress for
enacting harmful regulations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). We take no position on the merits of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or whether a different legislative response would have been preferable.
175. For efforts in that vein, see Judith Burns, SEC Warns of Uncoordinated Inquiries,
WALL. ST. J., Sept. 10, 2003, at C14 (noting a complaint by the SEC chairman that state officials
act “for political gain and may compromise federal investigations in the process”); Tom
Lauricella, et al., Morgan Stanley Case Illustrates States’ Strategy, WALL. ST. J., July 15, 2003, at
C1 (noting the passage of a bill by the House Financial Services subcommittee that would
weaken states’ ability to regulate the securities industry).
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contrast, any move by Delaware that earns it short-term plaudits but
undermines its long-term status as corporate domicile would make it a
loser.
B. The Symbiotic Relationship Between Federal Law and Delaware
Law
Delaware’s adherence to a traditional common law model and
the rules on jurisdiction and conflict of laws constrain its ability to
regulate. When rules are required (or thought to be required) that
Delaware is unwilling (because it would be in tension with the
common law model) or unable (because of jurisdictional and conflict
rules) to supply, any such regulations would be left to a hodgepodge of
state rules or, if a national solution is desirable, would have to be
imposed by the federal government.
One example of rules that would be difficult for Delaware to
supply is the mandatory disclosure rules imposed by the federal
securities laws. Consider, first, the logistical requirements. The
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance alone has about 400
employees,176 far more than the whole of the chancery and supreme
courts of Delaware. To be able to devise a similarly detailed
regulatory regime, Delaware would thus have to change its
lawmaking infrastructure radically. It could no longer rely on a small
body of judicial officers, but would instead have to establish a major
regulatory agency with a number of employees and a budget closer to
the SEC’s.177
Doing so, however, would generate two problems. First, it
would bring to the fore issues of democratic legitimacy that Delaware
would rather remain obscure. In particular, the adoption and revision
of regulations would entail more explicit lawmaking—and thus make
controversial political and normative choices more manifest—than at
present. Second, adopting a comprehensive regulatory regime would
be hampered by conflict rules and jurisdictional limitations. Unlike
conflict rules on the internal affairs of a corporation, conflict rules on
disclosure regulations with respect to the issuance and trading of

176. During fiscal year 2003, there were 341 staff in the Corporate Finance division and
another 92 in the related Office of Filing and Information Services. SEC, PROTECTING
INVESTORS: ANNUAL REPORT 2003 61 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/
ar03full.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
177. The SEC’s budget for fiscal year 2003 was approximately $717 million. Id. at 142.
Delaware’s entire budget outlay for the Division of Corporations, the Court of Chancery, and the
Supreme Court is about $10 million. State of Delaware, Office of the Budget Homepage,
http://www.state.de.us/budget/default.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
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securities do not point to the law of the state of incorporation.178 In
addition, Delaware lacks personal jurisdiction over various parties
subject to the federal regime, such as broker/dealers, 5-percent
shareholders, shareholders engaged in secondary offerings of
securities, shareholders who solicit proxies, accounting firms, and
employees engaged in insider trading. Delaware courts would thus
lack the ability to enforce the regulatory regime on these parties,
which would likely diminish greatly the effectiveness of any
regulatory structure.
More generally, there are several types of rules that Delaware
is unlikely to supply and for which federal regulation may (if the
requisite rules are indeed efficient) be desirable. The first type
concerns issues where prevailing state conflict rules do not point to
the state of incorporation. These include, for example, fraud in
connection with the sale of securities under Section 11 of the
Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act or the
manipulation of security prices.179
The second type concerns issues as to which individual states
cannot constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the relevant
defendants.180 Regulations under the Williams Act of bidders and 5percent shareholders, regulations of broker/dealers, disclosure
requirements for large shareholders under Section 16 of the Exchange
Act, and the prohibition against “insider” trading under the
misappropriation theory are examples of rules that Delaware could
not effectively enforce because its courts would lack the requisite
personal jurisdiction over most defendants.
The third type concerns issues where public enforcement is
preferable to private enforcement. This includes misconduct that is so
severe that criminal penalties are warranted and problems best
enforced through prophylactic rules by an administrative agency
rather than by private litigation. An example of the latter may be
rules against selective disclosure of information like Regulation FD,
violations of which may be publicly enforced but cannot form the basis
of a private lawsuit.181
The fourth type concerns issues for which a detailed rule-based
ex ante regulatory regime is desirable. An example may be the
178. See Romano, supra note 13, at 2402–12 (proposing change in the choice-of-law rules to
operationalize proposed state competition over securities regulation).
179. On the latter, see the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2005) and
regulations promulgated thereunder.
180. Note here the special broad rules on venue and jurisdiction in securities lawsuits.
Securities Exchange Act, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2005).
181. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2005).
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adoption of accounting rules guiding the manner in which a company
must disclose financial information, other specific disclosure
obligations, or specific rules exempting certain companies, securities,
or transactions from certain obligations.
The fifth type concerns issues that are so openly political that
they cannot be effectively adopted through a common law judge-made
system. An example would be the institution of a codetermination
regime, as it prevails in Germany, where employees have substantial
representation on the board of directors. A U.S. example might be the
adoption of a provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that
prohibits the payment of bribes without regard to their effect on the
firm.182
Finally, our analysis points to a sixth type of issue that
Delaware, although it may be able to regulate as effectively as a
federal lawmaker, would gladly yield to the feds. These are issues
that are both inherently difficult to regulate effectively and are
particularly likely to trigger a populist response. The prime example
of such a “hot potato” issue is executive compensation, a topic
regulated (ineffectively) by both federal and state law that regularly
invites populist anger over the stellar income of (not always stellar
performing) executives.
Federal law’s primacy in any of these areas does not
necessarily undermine Delaware’s position as national provider of
corporate law. To the contrary. If Delaware is not able to regulate
certain conduct effectively, it is probably in its interest to have this
conduct regulated on the federal level (or by other states) to fill the
lacunae in its own law. Without such federal regulation, continued
and unsanctioned wrongdoing could result in a populist backlash
against Delaware as the provider of an ineffective regulatory regime
and lead to a wholesale replacement of Delaware law. Federal
regulation can thus strengthen Delaware’s long-term position in two
ways. First, by making the system as a whole less scandal-prone,
federal regulation reduces the likelihood of a populist attack. Second,
to the extent that scandals nevertheless ensue, a federal regulatory
system provides an alternative target—a lightening rod from
Delaware’s perspective—for a populist attack. Indeed, the federal
regime—being more openly political, partisan, and publicly enforced—
may well make a more inviting target than Delaware.183

182. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2005).
183. In the recent scandals, for example, greater blame was given to the SEC than to
Delaware. See, e.g., Labaton, supra note 164 (discussing the shortcomings in the administration
of ousted SEC chairman Pitt).
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Thus, while Delaware lives under the constant threat of federal
preemption, there is as well a significant symbiotic element to the
relationship between federal law and Delaware law. Delaware
benefits from federal regulation, as long as it is in the right areas and
of the right sort.
CONCLUSION
The recent corporate scandals, and the various reactions of the
different regulatory actors, provide an opportunity to tease out some
important features of our corporate law federalism. In this Article, we
have argued that Delaware corporate law, and Delaware’s reaction to
corporate crises, must be analyzed from within the institutional and
political landscape in which Delaware’s regulatory powers coexist
with, and can be constrained by, the powers of the federal government
and the various other states. From this perspective, the 19th century
common law style of Delaware corporate lawmaking can be
understood as a creative use of anachronism, as an invocation of
apolitical technocratic expertise as a way of making up for an arguable
lack of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, the scope of
Delaware’s law is crafted in a way that minimizes conflicts with other
jurisdictions. Because of the constraints placed on Delaware by the
federalist structure, the relationship between federal law and
Delaware law can be best understand as symbiotic rather than merely
competitive. Although Delaware is threatened by federal preemption,
it is also served by federal regulations that regulate areas which
Delaware cannot regulate effectively. Such regulations help ward-off
crises and thus provide a lightening rod for a populist backlash that
could produce severe harm to Delaware’s position as the creator of our
de facto national corporate law.

